

# NORDEN AS AN ARGUMENT

The 1994 EU-referenda in Helsingin Sanomat, Dagens Nyheter  
and Aftenposten

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The dramatic changes in Europe after the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union made the early 1990s an important transition period. The Nordic third way between American capitalism and Soviet communism lost significance and the economic recession in Finland and Sweden led to cutbacks in the famous welfare systems. The Nordic countries Finland, Sweden and Norway became economically and politically dependent on the European Union and eventually applied for EU-membership. The three referenda were held in the autumn of 1994. Finland and Sweden approved of EU-membership, while the Norwegians voted no. This thesis looks at how Norden, the geographical and historical region consisting of the five Nordic countries Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden and Norway, coped with this new situation by analysing how Norden was presented as an argument in the debate leading up to the referenda.

Using media content analysis, this study describes and analyses the use of Norden in the editorial pages of the three major Nordic newspapers Helsingin Sanomat in Finland, Dagens Nyheter in Sweden and Aftenposten in Norway. The analysis comprises approximately one month of editorial pages from each newspaper. The study also discusses how a Nordic identity was visible in the sources. A unique code schedule was developed in order to show in which thematic circumstances Norden appeared as well as which attitudes were used in the coverage of Norden.

The study has three main findings. Firstly, contrary to what many scholars believed in the early 1990s, Norden never lost value for the Nordics but simply fell out of fashion when the EU became a more attractive alternative. Secondly, the Nordic interdependence remained strong although the Nordic reality was shaken. And thirdly, the belief that Norden was better than others still prevailed. An additional finding is that Nordic identity, although not explicitly mentioned in the editorials, permeated the whole debate on Norden.

For the Nordic countries, Norden is an additional level of identification between the national and the international, which in this case has been the EU. The entry of the EU in the debate in Norden did not mean that Norden automatically disappeared. This study shows that cooperation between the Nordic countries and cooperation within the EU can co-exist, they are not mutually exclusive. Contrary to the belief among scholars in the early 1990s that the Nordic identity found itself in a crisis after the end of the Cold War, this study suggests that the Nordic identity remained strong, although somewhat overshadowed by the EU.

Avainsanat – Nyckelord – Keywords

Norden, EU, referendum, identity, media, content analysis, newspapers, Helsingin Sanomat, Dagens Nyheter, Aftenposten, Finland, Sweden, Norway



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Tiivistelmä – Referat – Abstract <p>De dramatiska förändringarna som skedde i Europa efter Kalla krigets slut och Sovjetunionens fall gjorde det tidiga 1990-talet till ett viktigt brytningsskede. Den nordiska tredje vägen mellan kapitalismen i USA och kommunismen i Sovjet förlorade betydelse och den ekonomiska recessionen i Finland och Sverige ledde till nedskärningar i de berömda välfärdssystemen. De nordiska länderna Finland, Sverige och Norge blev allt mer beroende av den Europeiska Unionen, både ekonomiskt och politiskt, och de beslöt sig för att ansöka om EU-medlemskap. De tre nordiska folkomröstningarna ordnades hösten 1994. Finland och Sverige röstade för ett EU-medlemskap medan norrmännen röstade nej. Den här avhandlingen ser på hur Norden, alltså den geografiska och historiska regionen bestående av de fem nordiska länderna Danmark, Finland, Island, Norge och Sverige, klarade sig i den nya situationen genom att analysera hur Norden presenterades som ett argument i debatten inför folkomröstningarna.</p> <p>Metoden som används i avhandlingen är innehållsanalys. Studien beskriver och analyserar hur Norden användes på ledarsidorna i de tre stora dagstidningarna Helsingin Sanomat i Finland, Dagens Nyheter i Sverige och Aftenposten i Norge. Analysen omfattar ledarsidor under ungefär en månads tid per tidning. Studien diskuterar också hur en nordisk identitet var synlig i källorna. Ett unikt kodningsschema har utarbetats för att kunna påvisa dels i vilka tematiska sammanhang Norden nämndes och dels vilka attityder som var synliga i rapporteringen om Norden.</p> <p>Forskningen har resulterat i tre huvudsakliga upptäckter. För det första, i motsats till vad många forskare trodde i början av 1990-talet så förlorade Norden aldrig sitt värde för nordborna utan blev bara omodernt när EU blev ett mer attraktivt alternativ. För det andra, det ömsesidiga beroendet mellan de nordiska länderna var fortfarande starkt trots att den nordiska verkligheten skakades om. För det tredje, övertygelsen om att Norden var bättre än andra rådde fortfarande. En annan upptäckt var att den nordiska identiteten genomsyrade hela debatten om Norden trots att den inte nämndes explicit i ledarartiklarna.</p> <p>För de nordiska länderna utgör Norden en extra nivå att identifiera sig med, mellan den nationella och den internationella nivån, som i det här fallet utgörs av EU. När EU entrade scenen i Norden betydde det inte att Norden per automatik försvann. Den här avhandlingen visar att samarbete mellan de nordiska länderna och samarbete inom EU kan existera samtidigt, det ena utesluter inte det andra. I motsats till de forskare som i början av 1990-talet trodde att den nordiska identiteten befann sig i en kris efter Kalla krigets slut, så visar den här avhandlingen att den nordiska identiteten fortfarande var stark, men dock en aning överskuggad av EU.</p>			
Avainsanat – Nyckelord – Keywords Norden, EU, folkomröstning, identitet, media, innehållsanalys, tidningar, Helsingin Sanomat, Dagens Nyheter, Aftenposten, Finland, Sverige, Norge			

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# 1 Introduction

In the autumn of 1994, the European Union was on everybody's lips in the three Nordic countries Finland, Sweden and Norway. In three separate referenda, the Finns, Swedes and Norwegians were asked whether their countries should join the European Union or not. The rapid changes in Europe, caused by the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, forced the Nordic countries to redefine their position in the world. The Nordic "third way" or "middle way"<sup>1</sup>, which had been so well known during the Cold War, suddenly lost significance when the world was no longer divided between the two superpowers USA and the Soviet Union. *Norden*<sup>2</sup>, which is composed of the five very closely connected countries Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden and which had been seen as a region associated with progressivity, neutrality, and a well-developed welfare system, lost some of its peculiarity in this new situation. In addition, the economic crises in Finland and Sweden in the early 1990s led to cutbacks in the welfare, which made some scholars refer to the situation in the Nordic countries as "the end of the welfare state".<sup>3</sup> Others went as far as saying that the old way of defining Norden was dead.<sup>4</sup> In a debate book, published by the Nordic Council in August 1994, researcher Pertti Joenniemi wrote:

"It is obvious that the Nordic cooperation as a sphere has lost significance in the power structure that has risen after the Cold War. The Nordic self-esteem has decreased; positions concerning the future of Norden have a defensive character. The meeting with the European has caused a fight over the Nordic".<sup>5</sup> (My translation)

The new geopolitical situation together with an increased significance of the EU, both economically and politically, forced Nordic politicians to reformulate their stands on the

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<sup>1</sup> The concept the "middle way" was first coined by the American journalist Marquis Childs, who published his book *Sweden: the Middle Way* in 1936. The concept has later, together with the concept of the "third way", been used in a wider sense, to describe not only the Swedish model but also the Nordic model as an alternative to capitalism, on the one hand, and communism, on the other.

<sup>2</sup> In this thesis, I will use the Scandinavian word *Norden* when referring to the five Northern European countries: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Strictly speaking, Norden also include the autonomous areas: the Faroe Islands, Greenland and the Åland Islands. In my research, however, they will receive lesser attention. The same applies for Iceland, as the EU debate was not yet a current issue there in 1994.

<sup>3</sup> Henningsen, Bernd (1997): The Swedish Construction of Nordic Identity. In Stråth, Bo – Sørensen, Øystein (ed.). *The Cultural Construction of Norden*. Scandinavian University Press (Universitetsforlaget AS), Oslo, 94.

<sup>4</sup> Joenniemi, Pertti (1994a): Norden – en europeisk megaregion? In Karlsson, Svenolof (ed.). *Norden är död. Länge leve Norden! En debattbok om de nordiska länderna som en 'megaregion' i Europa*. Nordiska rådet, Stockholm, 23-81.

<sup>5</sup> Joenniemi 1994a, 39.

European integration. But the decision to apply for EU-membership, and even more so the results of the referenda, also had an effect on the Nordic reality. After being a stable concept during the Cold War, a redefinition of what Norden really meant, was underway. Several researchers claimed that Norden had fallen into an identity crisis. When Norden no longer was different from the rest of Europe, the Nordic identity, which had been built on difference, was, according to them, at a loss. This study will therefore look into how Norden and the Nordic identity were manifested at the time of the three Nordic EU-referenda. By conducting a content analysis of newspaper editorials in the three major Nordic newspapers Helsingin Sanomat, Dagens Nyheter and Aftenposten, I hope to show how some of the most important creators of public opinion framed Norden prior to the referenda. How was Norden used as an argument in the EU-debates? Was Norden put in contrast to Europe or was Norden seen as a part of Europe? Was the Nordic identity really in a crisis?

## **1.1 Background**

### **The Nordic countries' way to the EU**

When the European integration project<sup>6</sup> started in the early 1950s none of the Nordic countries were willing or able to join the project. David Phinnemore mentions two factors why this did not happen: a strong attachment to national identity and national sovereignty as well as the incompatibility of the neutral countries Sweden and Finland to join a supranational organisation.<sup>7</sup> Access to the trade markets was, however, crucial for the Nordic countries and when Britain, in 1959, took the initiative to establish a European Free Trade Association (EFTA) as an alternative to the European Economic Community (EEC), the Nordic countries Sweden, Norway and Denmark were all among the founding members.<sup>8</sup> In consideration to its Soviet neighbour, Finland concluded a separate free trade agreement with EFTA in 1961, but eventually became a full member in 1986. The fifth Nordic country, Iceland, became a member of EFTA in

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<sup>6</sup> The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established in 1951, followed by the European Economic Community (EEC) and EURATOM in 1957. In 1967, these three institutions were later merged together into the European Communities (EC). The founding members of the European integration were: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

<sup>7</sup> Phinnemore, David (1996): The Nordic countries, the European Community (EC) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 1958-84. In Miles, Lee (ed.). *The European Union and the Nordic Countries*. Routledge, London, 34.

<sup>8</sup> EFTA was founded in 1960 by Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

1970.<sup>9</sup> When Britain, together with Ireland, applied for membership in the EEC one year after the establishment of EFTA, Denmark and Norway decided to follow.<sup>10</sup> For Sweden, an application for an association agreement with the EC was enough, while Finland and Iceland had neither intention or plans to join the Community nor to aspire an associate status. The British application was, however, vetoed by the French president Charles de Gaulle, and as a consequence the accession negotiations with all four countries ended. In 1967, the same procedure was repeated: Britain, Ireland, Norway and Denmark applied for membership in the EEC, but de Gaulle vetoed and the negotiations ended. When de Gaulle resigned in 1969, the applications were reactivated and in 1973, Britain, Ireland and Denmark joined the European Communities. In Norway, the population voted against EC-membership in a referendum in 1972.<sup>11</sup> In Sweden, EC-membership was seen as incompatible with the country's neutrality policy. Instead, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland all signed separate free trade agreements with the EC.

As described in the book *Norden i sicksack. Tre spårbyten inom nordiskt samarbete* edited by Bengt Sundelius and Claes Wiklund, Nordic and European integration has always been closely connected.<sup>12</sup> A failure in Nordic cooperation has often been followed by, or in some cases due to, a success in the European integration. Similarly, when the European project has encountered problems, the Nordic cooperation has often been strengthened. For instance, the Nordic customs union, which was being planned during the 1950s, was eventually abandoned when Sweden, Norway and Denmark joined the EFTA. Correspondingly, the Danish and Norwegian EEC-applications made it important to write down the agreements made so far within the Nordic cooperation and therefore the Helsinki Treaty, which stipulates the official Nordic cooperation, was ratified in 1962. Claes Wiklund writes, "Only through references to a binding international treaty was the Nordic cooperation considered to be able to stay intact in

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<sup>9</sup> EFTA (2012): *EFTA through the years*, website.

<sup>10</sup> Mission of Norway to the European Union (2012): *Norway and the EU – An Historical Overview*, website.

<sup>11</sup> Mission of Norway to the European Union (2012): *Norway and the EU – An Historical Overview*, website.

<sup>12</sup> Sundelius, Bengt – Wiklund, Claes (ed.) (2000): *Norden i sicksack. Tre spårbyten inom nordiskt samarbete*. Santérus Förlag, Stockholm.



the situation where one or several Nordic countries joined the EEC”.<sup>13</sup> A third example of how the Nordic and European integration has taken place parallelly in Norden is the case of Nordek. After de Gaulle had vetoed the British, and by consequence also the Danish and Norwegian EEC-applications for the second time, a deeper Nordic economic cooperation was planned in its place. Nordek would include a Nordic customs union and Nordic structural and development funds, but the plan was eventually abandoned after de Gaulle had resigned and a Danish and Norwegian membership in the EEC became possible.<sup>14</sup>

In the 1980s, the cooperation between the EFTA and the EC gradually intensified. A significant milestone in the relations between EFTA and the EC was the Luxembourg Declaration of 1984, where a plan of closer cooperation between them was agreed with the intention of creating a better functioning free market.<sup>15</sup> In 1989, the idea of institutionalising the relations between the EFTA and the EC was launched by the President of the EC Commission, Jacques Delors.<sup>16</sup> Finland, Sweden and Norway welcomed the idea of a European Economic Area (EEA) since it gave them access to the EC’s Single Market, while in the same time offering a “de-politicised version of the EC membership”<sup>17</sup>. But during the EEA negotiations, the EFTA countries started questioning whether the EEA-agreement suited their long-term needs. The EFTA countries were increasingly economically dependent on the EC, while the EEA-agreement would not allow them to participate in the decision-making of the EC.<sup>18</sup> The EEA-agreement was finally signed in May 1992 and it came into force in January 1994. By this time, Sweden, Finland and Norway had all applied for full membership in the EC.

Sieglinde Gstöhl calls the EFTA countries “reluctant Europeans”, since they for a long time did not want to join the European Communities although they met the criteria for

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<sup>13</sup> Wiklund, Claes (2000a): 1962 års Helsingforsavtal – den första heltäckande nordiska samarbetstraktaten. In Sundelius, Bengt – Wiklund, Claes (ed.). *Norden i sicksack. Tre spårbyten inom nordiskt samarbete*. Santérus Förlag, Stockholm, 100.

<sup>14</sup> Wiklund, Claes (2000b): Nordek-planen och dess föregångare. In Sundelius, Bengt – Wiklund, Claes (ed.). *Norden i sicksack. Tre spårbyten inom nordiskt samarbete*. Santérus Förlag, Stockholm, 107-123.

<sup>15</sup> Aunesluoma, Juhana (2011): *Vapaakaupan tiellä. Suomen kauppaja integraatiopolitiikka maailmansodista EU-aikaan*. Suomen Kirjallisuuden Seura, Helsinki, 384-387.

<sup>16</sup> Gstöhl, Sieglinde (1996): The Nordic countries and the European Economic Area (EEA). In Miles, Lee (ed.). *The European Union and the Nordic Countries*. Routledge, London, 55-56.

<sup>17</sup> Gstöhl, 56.

<sup>18</sup> Gstöhl, 60.

membership at an early stage.<sup>19</sup> The main factor for the Nordic countries to participate in the European integration has not been political, but economic.<sup>20</sup> For different reasons, a full membership in the EC and later the EU had been seen as impossible during a long period of time and it was not until the early 1990s that Nordic politicians started talking warmly about a EU-membership. In Sweden, the reluctance towards the EC/EU stemmed from the incompatibility with the country's policy of non-alignment and a membership in a supranational organisation. For Finland, an orientation towards Western Europe was more tempting, but impossible with regards to the big neighbour in the East. Finnish post-war politics and up until the fall of the Soviet Union, was characterised by an unwillingness to irritate the Soviet leadership and the Fenno-Soviet Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance was in force until the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As long as the agreement was in force, it made Finland's EU-membership in practice impossible. In Norway, the popular suspicion towards centrally controlled organisations like the EC/EU has always been strong, although the political elite has been more favourably disposed towards European integration.

There were several reasons why Sweden eventually applied for full EC/EU-membership. The economic dependency towards the EC in addition to the lack of influence on the decision-making within the EEA framework was one important factor. Both Sweden and Finland were subjected to an economic recession in the early 1990s, which made an increased economic cooperation within the EC even more attractive. The geopolitical changes ended the division of Europe into two and the importance of the Swedish neutrality policy declined. The position of the Swedish Social Democratic government in the EU-matter during 1990 could be described as a gradual U-turn. Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson wrote several articles in the newspaper Dagens Nyheter, where he described how the EC-obstacles could be cleared away.<sup>21</sup> According to Swedish historian Bo Stråth, a redefinition of the concept of neutrality was in progress and the peak of this redefinition was in October 1990, when the Swedish

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<sup>19</sup> Gstöhl, 48.

<sup>20</sup> Phinnemore, 33.

<sup>21</sup> Stråth, Bo (1993): *Folkhemmet mot Europa Ett historiskt perspektiv på 90-talet*. Tiden, Falun, 235.

government declared its wish to have a closer relationship to the EC than the EEA agreement would allow.<sup>22</sup> In practice, that signified a full membership.

The Swedish government's announcement in October 1990 to seek full membership in the EC, took the Finnish leadership by surprise. In Finnish president Mauno Koivisto's opinion, the EEA-agreement was enough to fulfil the Finnish economic needs and he was disappointed that the Nordic cooperation once again had been faced with an accomplished fact without any preliminary discussions.<sup>23</sup> This shows how important the feeling of solidarity was in Norden. Eventually Finland also followed its neighbour country and submitted a membership application in March 1992. Heikki Paloheimo points out that the Finnish decision to apply for EU-membership was above all due to economic reasons. The Finnish government believed that a EU-membership would help the recovery from the economic recession of the early 1990s, increase the standard of living and allow Finland to participate in the EU decision-making.<sup>24</sup> Other scholars have stressed also security considerations and identity politics.<sup>25</sup> After Sweden and Finland had applied for membership, Norway found it necessary to follow its Nordic neighbours. According to Lee Miles, the Norwegian incentives for applying for EU-membership were more political than economic. Norway had not experienced the same kind of recession as Finland and Sweden thanks to the country's oil exports.<sup>26</sup> Ever since the No in the EC-referendum in 1972, European integration had been a difficult subject in Norway, but after the Swedish and Finnish applications, the Norwegian government headed by Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland quickly submitted the Norwegian application in November 1992.<sup>27</sup>

### **The EU-campaigns in Finland, Sweden and Norway**

After the negotiation processes between the Nordic countries and the EU had been finalized, the people of these countries were to give their opinions on the negotiated

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<sup>22</sup> Stråth, 236

<sup>23</sup> Koivisto, Mauno (2008): *Grannar. Frändskap och friktion*. Atlantis, Stockholm and Söderströms, Helsinki, 188.

<sup>24</sup> Paloheimo, Heikki (1995): Pohjoismaiden EU-kansanäänestykset: puolueiden peruslinjat ja kansalaisten mielipiteet Suomessa, Ruotissa ja Norjassa. In *Politiikka*, 37(2), 115.

<sup>25</sup> Aunesluoma, 491-496.

<sup>26</sup> Miles, Lee (1996): The Nordic countries and the fourth EU enlargement. In Miles, Lee (ed.). *The European Union and the Nordic Countries*. Routledge, London, 65.

<sup>27</sup> Miles, 65.

agreements.<sup>28</sup> Out of the Nordic countries, the Finnish referendum was scheduled first, on October 16, 1994. The Swedish referendum followed on November 13, 1994 and the Norwegian referendum was held on November 28, 1994. The EU-opponents were critical to the order of the referenda, where the least sceptical Finns were to vote first, followed by the Swedes and the last election was to be held in the most EU-sceptical country, Norway. This order was believed to create a domino effect, where the Finnish results would have an effect on the Swedish results and these in turn would influence the Norwegian results.

Heikki Paloheimo's article *Pohjoismaiden EU-kansanäänestykset: puolueiden peruslinjat ja kansalaisten mielipiteet Suomessa, Ruotsissa ja Norjassa*<sup>29</sup> provides a useful overview on the political and public opinion on the EU-issue in the three Nordic countries. According to him, the EU-debate in Finland was largely affected by the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The turbulences in the Eastern neighbour country influenced the debate on Finland's security policy and also led to an economic recession. Another argument was that Finland by joining the EU would prove that the country belonged to the West. Finnish Member of Parliament, Mikko Rönholm (Social Democratic Party), went as far as saying that the decision stood between "kyllä ja niet"<sup>30</sup>. The main arguments of the Finnish EU-opponents were linked to the EU agricultural policy and a fear of losing the country's independence. There was also a fear of higher unemployment rates and a decrease in the Nordic social security system. At the end of the 1980s, no political party in Finland was yet in favour of EC-membership, but by the time of the referendum, all large political parties were positive towards an accession, except for the Left Alliance and the Greens who did not officially take sides. Among the people, however, the opinions were divided.

Also in Sweden, most of the large political parties were pro-EU, although some parties had some reservations. The Left Party and the Green Party were clearly against an accession. The Swedish EU-referendum in mid-November was preceded by Parliamentary elections in mid-September. The Social Democrats regained power and

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<sup>28</sup> Austria had applied for EU-membership already in July 1989 and was together with Sweden, Finland and Norway the candidate countries for the fourth EU-enlargement.

<sup>29</sup> Paloheimo, Heikki (1995): *Pohjoismaiden EU-kansanäänestykset: puolueiden peruslinjat ja kansalaisten mielipiteet Suomessa, Ruotsissa ja Norjassa*. In *Politiikka*, 37(2).

<sup>30</sup> In English that would be "Yes and Nyet". Nyet means No in Russian.

Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson pleaded the Social Democratic partisans to vote Yes to the EU. Both the Yes-side and the No-side used the economy and the jobs as one of their main arguments. The Yes-side believed the EU would help the economy while the No-side thought the EU would make the economic situation even worse. Moreover, the No-side feared that Sweden would lose its right of self-determination. According to Paloheimo, the importance of the West as a cultural point of reference was not as important in Sweden as it was in Finland and the same applies for the security policy issues.

In Norway, the debate was much fiercer than in the neighbouring countries. The No-supporters' strongest arguments, as listed by Paloheimo, were the fishing industry, the agriculture, the regional policy and keeping the Northern parts of Norway inhabited. In addition to these arguments, there was also a fear of having to share the proceeds from the oil industry with other countries, a fear of a decline in the equality between the sexes and an intensified political cooperation within the EU as well as the plain fact of once again being in a union. Norway did not gain its independence until 1905 when the union with Sweden was dissolved. Among the political parties, only Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland's party the Social Democrats and the Conservative Party were pro-EU, while the Centre Party, the Christian Democrats and the Socialist Left Party were against EU-membership and the Liberal Party and the populist Progress Party did not take stands.

## **1.2 Previous research**

The EU-referenda in Finland, Sweden and Norway have given rise to a vast amount of research. The previously conducted literature could be divided into studies on the historical context leading up to the referenda, studies on the campaigns and the actual referenda and, lastly, the effects and consequences of the referenda results. For the purpose of this study, it is most valuable to give an overview of the studies made on the actual referenda. The subject of the studies in this area varies from the political party positions concerning the EU, the arguments for and against EU-accession, the activities of the popular movements, and the coverage of the referenda in the media, among others. For my research, the media coverage of the referenda is the most relevant.

In Finland, a research project, which lasted from the fall of 1992 until the turn of the year 1995-1996, and which was financed by the Academy of Finland, examined the EU-debate in Finland from the point of view of the citizens, the media and the actors in the debate. The vast research project resulted in a book edited by Ullamaija Kivikuru.<sup>31</sup> The editor Kivikuru states that the EU-referendum was the biggest publicity process in Finland since the wars and that the role of the mass media was already before the referendum predicted to have a decisive effect on the results.<sup>32</sup> The actual research on the Finnish media in the EU-referenda context showed that the citizens felt that the media had allied itself with the pro-EU decision-makers and that few alternative discourses were presented to the citizens.<sup>33</sup> This study reveals a lot about the media climate in Finland but do not cover the Nordic aspect of the referenda.

A lot of comparisons between different news media as well as analyses on how the media portrayed different aspects of the EU-debate have been done, but most of them only offer national comparisons of the media in one of the three countries. An example of this is Ingunn Breivik's<sup>34</sup> master's thesis on the rhetoric of the EU-matter in the editorial pages of four Norwegian newspapers. She examined whom the different newspapers saw as the opponents in the EU-debate and she also described which rhetorical methods the newspapers used to describe these opponents. Her results showed that both Yes-papers and No-papers used methods like stereotypes, and pessimistic descriptions to defame people with other opinions than the newspapers. Tuomo Mörä's<sup>35</sup> doctoral dissertation is also set in the EU-referenda context, but in Finland. His approach is somewhat different, since he, by interviewing journalists in Finnish media, aims at explaining "[W]hy some issues, angles and actors received more coverage than [sic!] some others"<sup>36</sup>. Mörä, who also contributed with a text in the earlier mentioned book edited by Kivikuru, examines what factors lay behind the publication of certain EU-stories. Mörä's results are interesting, but while his study focuses on the factors, which influence journalists to write certain texts, my study concentrates on the

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<sup>31</sup> Kivikuru, Ullamaija (ed.) (1996): *Kansa euromyllyssä. Journalismi, kampanjat ja mediamaisemat Suomen EU-jäsenyysprosessissa*. Yliopistopaino, Helsinki.

<sup>32</sup> Kivikuru, 1-3.

<sup>33</sup> Kivikuru, 393-394.

<sup>34</sup> Breivik, Ingunn (2006): *EU-striden på leiarplass: Ein retorisk analyse av fire norske dagsaviser*. Universitet i Bergen, Bergen.

<sup>35</sup> Mörä, Tuomo (1999): *EU-journalismin anatomia. Mediasisältöjä muokanneet tekijät ennen kansanäänestystä 1994*. Yliopistopaino, Helsinki.

<sup>36</sup> Mörä, 279.

journalistic outcome or the content in the newspapers. Studies like Breivik's and Möra's are relevant to my research in the sense that they describe the media climate in Norway and Finland in the EU-context, but they do, however, lack a comparative angle. This angle is covered by Katarina Cygnel-Nuortie<sup>37</sup>, who has written her master's thesis on how business executives were portrayed in the press in Finland, Sweden and Norway prior to the referenda. She described how often business executives appeared, what opinions they represented and if there were differences or similarities between the presentations of these leaders in the three countries. My study will similarly compare the press in the three countries, but my research question concentrates on the presentation of Norden and Nordic identity instead of business managers. Moreover, my study aims at providing a deep, qualitative analysis of the meaning of Norden in the editorials and not merely a quantitative counting of the frequency of the mentions of Norden. I feel that there is a lack of empirical studies made on the significance of Norden in the light of the EU-referenda. I therefore believe that my research will fill a gap in the research on the EU-referenda as well as in the research on Nordic studies.

### 1.3 Research questions and concepts

As we all know, Finland and Sweden voted Yes to EU-membership in the autumn of 1994 while the Norwegians said No to the EU in their popular vote.<sup>38</sup> Finland and Sweden joined the European Union on January 1, 1995. In this study, the referenda results are of lesser importance, and the same applies to the national quarrels between the Yes- and the No-side. The focus in this study is instead put on how Norden was presented in the debate prior to the referenda and how Norden was used as an argument by the Yes- and the No-sides and in the different newspapers. An additional goal is to investigate whether a Nordic identity was referred to in the debate. Ever since the end of the Second World War, Norden had been a stable concept. The changes in Europe in the early 1990s also led to a redefinition of Norden. Several scholars were concerned with

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<sup>37</sup> Cygnel-Nuortie, Katarina (1996): *Yritysjohdaja julkisuudessa. Suomalaisten, ruotsalaisten ja norjalaisten yritysjohdajien osallistuminen joukkoviestimissä syksyllä 1994 käytyyn EU-keskusteluun*. Helsingin yliopisto, Helsinki.

<sup>38</sup> In Finland, 56.9% of the population wanted their country to join the European Union, while 43.1% voted No. In Sweden, the Yes-side won with 52.3% of the votes against 46.8% on the No-side. In Norway, 52.2% of the population voted No to EU-membership while 47.8% were willing to join the union. Sources: Pesonen, Pertti (ed.) (1994): *Suomen EU-kansanäänestys 1994. Raportti äänestäjien kannanotoista*. Ulkoasiainministeriö, Eurooppatiedotus, Painatuskeskus Oy, Helsinki, 183; Regeringskansliet Sverige (2012). *Genomförda nationella folkomröstningar*. Website; Official Statistics of Norway (1994): *The 1994 Referendum on Norwegian Membership of the EU*. Statistics Norway, Oslo-Kongsvinger, 12.

the Nordic identity being in a crisis and they sketched out possible paths Norden would take after the EU-accession of up to three more Nordic countries.<sup>39</sup> There are, however, few studies that provide empirical evidence of how the debate on the future Norden actually went at the time and that is where this study can offer something new. Unlike other studies on Norden's "health" at the time of the EU-referenda, this study is built on actual opinions, manifested through the editorial pages of three major Nordic newspapers. The reason why I have chosen to conduct a media content analysis is that media often provides a better overview of the current opinions than individual politicians do. In addition, research has shown that the media played an important role in the shaping of public opinion in the 1994 EU-referenda.<sup>40</sup> Thirdly, popular votes are unusual in the Nordic countries, and therefore it is reasonable to assume that the referenda generated lively debates. The voters were in need of information to be able to form their opinions.

The editorial pages are primarily a place where newspapers provide their analyses on current issues, but to a lesser extent they also give other voices the opportunity of being heard, for example in the form of guest columns or press cuttings. By analysing the editorial pages in Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat, Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter and Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten one month before each referendum, I therefore hope to answer the following question:

*- How was Norden presented in the editorial pages of the three Nordic newspapers Helsingin Sanomat, Dagens Nyheter and Aftenposten prior to the 1994 EU-referenda in Finland, Sweden and Norway?*

The supplementary questions are:

- How was Norden used as an argument in the discussion of joining the EU?*
- Was Norden viewed differently in the three countries?*
- How was Nordic identity visible in the editorial pages?*

## Concepts

Since one of the research questions is to investigate if there were references to Nordic identity in the sources, I find it useful to provide a definition of the concept *identity*. The

<sup>39</sup> See Wæver, Ole (1992a): Nordic Nostalgia: Northern Europe after the Cold War. In *International Affairs*, vol. 68 (1).; Joenniemi 1994a; Joenniemi 1994b

<sup>40</sup> See for example Kivikuru, Ullamaija (ed.) (1996): *Kansa euromyllyssä. Journalismi, kampanjat ja mediamaisemat Suomen EU-jäsenyyssprosessissa*. Yliopistopaino, Helsinki.



definitions of identity vary between, and within, different academic disciplines. There are also differences between individual and collective identities; there are national identities; regional identities; personal; vocational and sexual identities to mention a few. Generally speaking though, one could say, and as Steph Lawler also points out, that identity is about sameness and difference.<sup>41</sup> To identify with one group is, at the same time, to differentiate from another group. For instance, Stuart Hall argues that identities are constructed within discourse and through difference.<sup>42</sup> With this he means that identities are products of certain discourses, which differ according to the historical time and situation, and secondly, that identities are constructed in relation to what they are not. The division between “We” and the “Others” creates a common feeling of unity inside the We-group even though disunity also might exist within the We-group. Or as Hall puts it, “identities can function as points of identification and attachment only *because* of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, to render ‘outside’, abjected”.<sup>43</sup> Knowing the Other and the boundaries surrounding it is therefore needed to know the Self and the self’s boundaries. As already suggested by Hall, identities are constructions. They do not exist by themselves. Neither are identities constant; they are regularly subject of construction and reconstruction. Finnish philosopher Arto Mutanen writes:

“Explicating identity is a process of construction. The explication is a continuous process which has to be done over and over again to maintain the identity. The maintaining means not merely preserving the identity but also renewing it”.<sup>44</sup>

Thus, identifying with a certain group can mean different things at different times. From a sociological point of view, Steph Lawler argues that identities are socially produced. This happens through events like narratives, kin networks, and governance and interpellation. She claims that identities must be negotiated collectively and conform to social rules.<sup>45</sup> One person, group or why not state, can also have several identities. According to Lawler, these different identities “should be seen as interactive and mutually constitutive, rather than ‘additive’”. She also points out that tension between different identities is possible.

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<sup>41</sup> Lawler, Steph (2008): *Identity. Sociological perspectives*. Polity Press, Cambridge, Malden, 2.

<sup>42</sup> Hall, Stuart (2000): Who needs ‘identity’? In du Gay, Paul – Evans, Jessica – Redman, Peter (ed.). *Identity: A Reader*. SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, 17.

<sup>43</sup> Hall, 18.

<sup>44</sup> Mutanen, Arto (2010): About the Notion of Identity. In *LIMES*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 28.

<sup>45</sup> Lawler, 143.

## 1.4 Sources

My empirical material is collected from three major Nordic daily newspapers: Helsingin Sanomat (HS), Dagens Nyheter (DN) and Aftenposten (AP). The reason for choosing these newspapers is because they have a similar profile and status in their countries, which makes a comparison of them relevant. I have chosen to concentrate my research on daily newspapers, although in some countries some evening papers had bigger circulations. This decision is motivated by a general assumption that daily newspapers stand for a more nuanced and less sensational approach than evening papers do. The similarities between my newspapers are many. They were all among the biggest daily newspapers in their countries in 1994 and they are known for providing professional journalism. They appear seven days a week and they are all based in the capital city of their country: Helsingin Sanomat in Helsinki, Dagens Nyheter in Stockholm and Aftenposten in Oslo. All three newspapers were pro-EU and they clearly informed their readers of this in their editorials. As major dailies in their respective countries, the newspapers did, however, try to provide a nuanced coverage of the EU-debate. Taking these factors into consideration, these newspapers assumingly played an important role in framing the EU-debate. Below is a short description of each of the newspapers.

### **Helsingin Sanomat (HS)**

Helsingin Sanomat is by large the biggest newspaper in Finland. In 1994, it had a circulation of 475,910 on weekdays and 564,396 on Sundays.<sup>46</sup> HS was founded in 1889 and the political tendency of the newspaper is independent. In 1994, Janne Virkkunen was chief editor and the newspaper was owned by the media group Sanomat Osakeyhtiö. HS has a dominant role in the Helsinki-area as well as in Finland as a whole. In this respect, HS differs somewhat from DN and AP, in that the two latter face constant competition from other newspapers in their respective area. Next to Helsingin Sanomat, the biggest newspapers in Finland in 1994 were Aamulehti in Tampere and Turun Sanomat in Turku as well as the two evening papers Ilta-Sanomat and Iltalehti. After the biggest competitor to HS in the Helsinki-area, the conservative newspaper Uusi Suomi, was discontinued in 1991, HS strengthened its role in the capital city even

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<sup>46</sup> Levikintarkastus Oy (2012): Inspection manager Olli Aaltonen at the Finnish Audit Bureau of Circulations to Madeleine Nygrund February 10, 2012, 07:43. Email "Levikkitietoja" (in Nygrund's possession).

further.<sup>47</sup> The data collected from HS starts on October 16, 1994, which was the day of the Finnish referendum. From this date, the collected material goes back to September 19, 1994. To be able to say something about how Helsingin Sanomat covered the Swedish and Norwegian referenda, I have also included the days of the referenda in the two countries plus two days after the respective referendum, that is November 13–15, 1994 and November 28–30 1994. In total, I have collected 34 days of material from HS.

### **Dagens Nyheter (DN)**

Dagens Nyheter was the biggest Swedish daily newspaper in 1994, with a circulation of 379,700 during weekdays and 429,600 on Sundays.<sup>48</sup> The evening paper Expressen had a bigger circulation than DN on both weekdays and Sundays and the other evening paper, Aftonbladet, had a bigger circulation than DN on Sundays, but as mentioned earlier, in this research I only focus on daily newspapers. Other big Swedish newspapers were Göteborgsposten, Idag and Svenska Dagbladet. Dagens Nyheter was founded in 1864 and the political tendency of the newspaper is independent. The media group Bonnier AB owns DN and in 1994, Christina Jutterström was chief editor and holder of the publication licence. In Sweden the EU-referendum was held on November 13, 1994. My collected material starts from that date and goes back until October 16, 1994. Consequently, the Swedish material also covers the Finnish referendum on October 16. In addition to this, I have included the day of the Norwegian referendum and two days after the referendum, that is November 28-30, 1994. There was no DN published on Saturday, November 5, because of All Saint's Day. In total, I have collected 31 days of material from DN.

### **Aftenposten (AP)**

Aftenposten was the biggest subscribed daily newspaper in Norway in 1994. The newspaper, which was founded in 1860, comes out in two editions; in 1994 the morning edition had a circulation of 279,965 and the evening edition a circulation of 188,544.<sup>49</sup> The daily newspaper Verdens Gang (VG) had a larger circulation than Aftenposten in 1994, but VG was mostly sold in single copies. Aftenposten is commonly referred to as the biggest serious Norwegian newspaper, due to VG:s somewhat sensationalist approach to news. Both Aftenposten and VG are owned by the media group Schibsted.

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<sup>47</sup> Uppslagsverket Finland (2012): *Uusi Suomi*, website.

<sup>48</sup> Kungliga Biblioteket (2012): *Dagstidningar efter 1900 – Kungliga biblioteket*, website.

<sup>49</sup> Mediebedriftenes Landsforening (2012): *Samletabell opplag fra 1994*, Excel file on website.

Other big Norwegian newspapers are Dagbladet and Bergens Tidende. In 1994, the chief editor of Aftenposten was Einar Hanseid. The political tendency of the newspaper is liberal conservative. My data from AP starts on November 28, 1994, the day of the Norwegian referendum and goes back until November 1, 1994. This material covers the Swedish referendum on November 13, but not the Finnish referendum on October 16. I have therefore decided to add the day of the Finnish referendum and two days after the referendum, that is October 16-18, 1994. In total, I have collected 31 days of material from AP.

The purpose of editorial pages is, according to Swedish media researcher Lars Nord, to offer the readers the most important and most thoroughly revised texts of the day.<sup>50</sup> What differs editorial articles from other news articles is that editorials have a clear standpoint on matters and they often try to create opinions and provide recommendations.<sup>51</sup> Analysing editorial pages is especially interesting in connection to popular votes, since the people, more than in other elections, are in need of information and opinions to be able to decide how to vote. Editorial pages often have a fixed placing in the newspapers, so that readers easily can find the page. In 1994, this was the case with both Helsingin Sanomat and Dagens Nyheter, as the editorial page was always found on page A2. In Aftenposten, the placement of the editorial page differed from day to day. Since Aftenposten comes out in both a morning edition and an evening edition, I have decided to only include the editorial pages of the morning edition. Editorial pages normally consist of different elements, such as editorial texts, guest columns, and cartoons, to mention a few. I have decided to include all parts of the editorial pages in my material and not to make a difference between texts written by the newspaper's own staff and for example guest columns or press cuttings from other newspapers. One could argue that the latter kinds of texts do not represent the position of the newspapers. In my view, however, it is more important to provide an overall analysis of the editorial pages. When referring to a text written by an external writer, I will make this clear to the readers. Besides, even if not all guest columnists agree with the official position of the newspapers, it is the newspapers themselves who have chosen their columnists and they

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<sup>50</sup> Nord, Lars (2000): *Vår tids ledare. En studie av den svenska dagspressens politiska opinionsbildning*. Carlsson bokförlag, Stockholm, 54.

<sup>51</sup> Nord, 56.

can always ultimately refuse to publish a text, which is too much in contrast with their own opinions.

## 1.5 Methodology

The method used in this study is content analysis with a qualitative, descriptive and comparative approach. Content analysis has traditionally been an important method in communication research. One of the most well known authors of books on content analysis methodology, Klaus Krippendorff, characterizes content analysis as a method, which is empirically grounded, exploratory in process and predictive or inferential in intent.<sup>52</sup> This means that the analyst empirically gathers the data, which is being analysed. The most common data are texts, which also are the main analytical units in this thesis. The analyst wants to explain his or her data and provide the data with a meaning. The analyst also wants to draw conclusions out of the material. I will therefore not only provide a quantitative presentation of the results, but also describe the data in depth and try to provide meanings and generalisations concerning the sources. I will also compare the coverage of Norden in the three different newspapers.

To facilitate the analysis of the editorial pages, the different elements of the pages have been divided into analytical units, where an analytical unit is defined as a well-defined text, photograph or cartoon. For an analytical unit to become relevant in this study it has to refer to Norden or at least two Nordic countries and, in addition to this, it has to be situated in a EU-referenda context. Those units, which do not cover both the EU-referenda and Norden in some way, offer no answer to my research questions and will therefore not be taken into consideration. For example, an article published in Dagens Nyheter about a domestic issue in Finland will not qualify as a Nordic editorial. The main focus in such an editorial is on a domestic issue, even though the mere fact that the issue was published in another Nordic newspaper gives it an element of Nordicness. I have, however, decided that the element of Nordicness is not enough. If the domestic issue is believed to have consequences for another Nordic country or Norden as a whole, it will, on the other hand, be included. *Figure 1* below gives an example of what a typical editorial page from Aftenposten looks like. This particular page has five well-

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<sup>52</sup> Krippendorff, Klaus (2000): *Content Analysis: an Introduction to Its Methodology*. Sage Publications Inc., Thousand Oaks, xvii.

defined texts and one photograph. More precisely, the page consists of one long editorial text, one short editorial text, one photograph and three columns or commentaries. The texts may consist of sub-parts such as headlines, introductions, the actual texts, citations, picture by-lines, and presentations of the writers. I have, however, decided to include all these sub-parts into the same analytical unit, which I call a text. This decision is motivated by the goal to gain an overall picture of the content on the editorial pages. The same principle is applied to photographs and cartoons, as the caption below the picture is analysed together with the picture. A cartoon or photograph, which illustrates a text will be analysed together with its text and will be coded according to the type of text it illustrates. A cartoon or photograph standing on its own will, on the other hand, be analysed as a separate unit.



**Figure 1.** Editorial page from Aftenposten, November 7, 1994, page 14.

After the relevant analytical units have been gathered, I will continue by coding the different units. To codify is, according to Johnny Saldaña, “to arrange things in a

systematic order, to make something part of a system or classification, to categorize”.<sup>53</sup> Different qualitative researchers apply different methods to code their material. The code schedule I have developed ask questions including where and when the articles were published, the title and what kind of analytical unit they are, who produced them, a description and analysis of the units and what the themes and frames in the texts were. The code schedule is attached as an appendix in the end of this thesis. The main goal of the coding process is to find out in which circumstances Norden was present and which the attitudes towards Norden were.

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<sup>53</sup> Saldaña, Johnny (2000): *The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers*. SAGE Publications Ltd, London, 8.

## **2 The Nordic presence in the media**

The main arguments in the EU-referenda debate in the Nordic countries focused on matters like the economy, the jobs, the countries' right of self-determination and the security policy. Norden is generally not mentioned as one of the hot topics in the EU-debate, but my research of editorial pages in Helsingin Sanomat, Dagens Nyheter and Aftenposten shows that the Nordic aspect was a highly salient feature in the debate during the last month before the elections. The amount of editorial articles mentioning Norden in some way ranged from 22 to 39 in the three newspapers during the last month before each referendum. On average, this means about one editorial article per day, dealing with Norden. This chapter begins by presenting the frequency of editorials articles dealing with Norden in the three newspapers. It will then go on to describing through which subjects Norden was presented (themes) and which the attitudes were in the articles covering Norden (frames).

### **2.1 Norden a frequent feature in the newspaper editorials**


The highest amount of editorial articles mentioning Norden was found in Helsingin Sanomat. When taking into consideration the criteria that an analytical unit should include a mention of both Norden and the EU-referenda in some way, the total amount of analytical units found in the material was 39. Some days there were no mentions of Norden; other days there were two or even three units about Norden. The analysed units differed from pure editorial articles, columns, guest columns, press cuttings and cartoons. No relevant photographs were found in the material. The units were divided as showed in *Table 1*.

As the table shows, the units mentioning Norden in Helsingin Sanomat were a mix of the newspaper's own material and external texts like guest columns and press cuttings from other newspapers. In the case of HS, the editorial page was clearly not only used as a way of presenting the newspaper's own perception, but also as a way of mirroring the debate in the society. The high amount of press cuttings from other newspapers distinguished HS somewhat from the other two newspapers. However, the press cuttings in HS were generally short, while in Dagens Nyheter they were longer but fewer. Aftenposten did not publish any press cuttings on Norden at all. The total amount of analytical units in HS was, as mentioned, 39. It was the highest number of units in



the three newspapers analysed, which shows that Norden was a frequent topic in HS. However, the amount of analysed days was in the case of Helsingin Sanomat 34, while it was 31 in the case of Dagens Nyheter and Aftenposten. This fact might have influenced on the higher amount of units in HS.

**Table 1.** The analytical units in Helsingin Sanomat.




Dagens Nyheter did not cover Norden as frequently as Helsingin Sanomat did, out of 31 editorial pages, the total amount of relevant units rose to 22. Moreover, DN did not publish as many press cuttings or guest columns as HS did, which indicates that the DN editorial page was more sacred to its own journalists than external moulders of public opinion. This might be a reflection of the two newspapers' different statuses. While Helsingin Sanomat held a strong position as the by far biggest Finnish newspaper, Dagens Nyheter was in a position where it had to compete with several other newspapers of approximately the same size. This fact may have led DN to differentiate itself from its competitors by developing an own, clear voice, displayed at the editorial pages.

Many themes discovered were the same in DN and HS. Interestingly enough though, some of the themes were referred to as something typical Nordic in HS, while in DN they were referred to as typical Swedish. Since the Nordic dimension was one criterion

when sorting out the analytical units, these texts could not be included in the DN material. That is one important reason why the units in DN were fewer. The difference in referring to matters as typical Nordic or typical Swedish is in any case an interesting observation and I will return to this finding later on. The photographs and cartoons in DN all illustrated domestic or international issues, no Nordic matters. *Table 2* shows the division of analytical units in Dagens Nyheter.


**Table 2.** The analytical units in Dagens Nyheter.



In the last newspaper, Aftenposten, 32 units on Norden were found, out of the 31 editorial pages. Norden was mainly discussed in the newspaper's own editorial texts and in the commentaries written by the journalists of the newspaper. Aftenposten did not publish any press cuttings from other newspapers like HS and DN did, and the amount of guest columns was also scarce. From a media landscape point of view, Aftenposten was in a similar position as Dagens Nyheter, as it competed against several other Norwegian newspapers of similar size and status. The theory that this kind of situation forces newspapers to concentrate on a strong, own opinion displayed in the editorial pages therefore seems to hold true. The large amount of long editorial texts gives a hint that the newspaper viewed it necessary to provide long and detailed standpoints on the approaching referendum. This could be connected with the fact that the Norwegians were the most sceptical towards the EU out of the Nordics and that the newspaper, as a

pronounced Yes-paper, felt a responsibility to try to convince its readers to vote Yes. Aftenposten also distinguishes itself by its many, often satirical cartoons. Two cartoons had a Nordic dimension in them and are therefore included in the material. *Table 3* below shows how the analytical units in Aftenposten were divided.

**Table 3.** The analytical units in Aftenposten.



## 2.2 The thematic use and the portrayal of Norden

As the tables above show, Norden was a frequent feature in the newspaper debate. But since Norden is such a broad concept it is not really comparable with other, individual topics in the debate, like the jobs or the environment. Rather, Norden was visible as a catchall dimension, embracing different topics but in the same time standing above the thematic level of discussion. While reading through the analytical units mentioning both Norden and the EU-referenda there were, however, certain themes that recurred over and over again. A typical theme was for example Nordic cooperation or Nordic values. In addition to the themes, Norden was also portrayed differently in the articles. One editorial article about Nordic cooperation could portray cooperation in a nostalgic way, while another article about the same theme could refer to the benefits of Nordic cooperation. I have chosen to call the different ways of portraying Norden the frame of the article. Framing is a common concept in media research, especially in the news

framing theory. According to the theory, news media has the power of framing debates by highlighting some perspectives of an argument and as a consequence, by leaving out some other perspectives. Robert M. Entman describes the theory as follows:

“To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described”.<sup>54</sup>

I have been somewhat inspired by the news framing theory, but the themes and frames developed in this research are unique for this study as they have arisen inductively from the sources. Together they provide a two-dimensional way of looking at the sources, as they tell us in which thematic circumstances Norden was mentioned as well as which the inward sense or the essence of the articles mentioning Norden was. As *Table 4* here below shows, a total of eight themes and seven frames were found in the articles. The same theme could be presented through different frames.

**Table 4.** The themes and frames discovered in the newspaper material.

<b>NORDEN: THEMES</b>	<b>NORDEN: FRAMES</b>
<i>Values</i>	<i>Point of reference</i>
<i>Cooperation</i>	<i>Conflict</i>
<i>Unity</i>	<i>Responsibility</i>
<i>Economy</i>	<i>Nostalgia vs. Changes</i>
<i>Security policy</i>	<i>Fear vs. Courage</i>
<i>Influence</i>	<i>Self-esteem</i>
<i>Religion</i>	<i>Benefits</i>
<i>Environment</i>	

<sup>54</sup> Entman, M. Robert (1993): Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. In *Journal of Communication*, 43(4), 52.

The following definitions show the characteristics of each theme and frame.

### **Themes**

#### *Values*

The editorial articles coded according to this theme ascribed Norden with certain values. These values included openness, democracy, equality, a high level of social welfare, solidarity, and a concern for the environment, among others. These values were thought to have a special Nordic dimension in them and in other places in the world, these values were not thought to be as important as they were in Norden.

#### *Cooperation*

This theme dealt with Nordic cooperation, both in the meaning of concrete cooperation on a certain issue and through ideas of a Nordic union or a Nordic bloc. The opinions on whether this Nordic cooperation would succeed better inside the EU or on the outside diverged in the debate.

#### *Unity*

This theme was often expressed through a feeling rather than something concrete. But the unity-aspect was also expressed through words like “brother”, “closest neighbours” and especially in the case of Norway through a fear of division and isolation from its Nordic neighbours.

#### *Economy*

This topic dealt with the economic consequences of joining or not joining the European Union and the Nordic countries’ influence on each other’s economies. This was, for example, done through comparisons between the Nordic countries as well as discussions on the consequences of another Nordic country’s actions.

#### *Security policy*

Editorial articles coded according to this theme discussed the new geopolitical situation and the consequences of it on the security policy in Norden. The future of the Swedish and Finnish neutrality was discussed within this theme, as well as Norway’s membership in Nato. Future security cooperation between the Nordic countries was discussed both in a EU-context and outside of the EU.

### *Influence*

This theme is twofold. On the one hand, the editorials in this theme discussed the possibilities of the Nordic countries to influence on the politics within the European Union, by, for example, coordinating all the Nordic votes in order to get a bill of Nordic interest passed. On the other hand, this theme discussed the Nordic influence internally in Norden, especially the influence the Nordic countries had on each other's EU-campaigns. The results or the expected results of the three Nordic EU-referenda were salient features in the editorials of all three countries.

### *Religion*

This theme was quite rare, but a few articles discussed the Church's role in the EU-referenda and compared how the Churches in Norway, Sweden and Finland handled the EU-question.

### *Environment*

Quite a few articles mentioned the environment as an important Nordic value, but not so many articles had environment as the dominant theme. Those articles, which were coded with environment as the dominant theme, discussed whether Nordic environmental goals could be best achieved inside or outside of the EU.

## **Frames**

### *Point of reference*

This frame portrayed Norden as the natural point of reference. Whenever Finland, Sweden or Norway was brought up against a problem or question, another Nordic country was pointed out as a reference or as an example to follow.

### *Conflict*

The essence in this frame was conflict. It could be a disagreement between Yes- and No-supporters concerning the EU-matter, a conflict between Norden and the EU or between different values. The editorials coded according to this frame could also present contradicting ideas of a theme, like for example the future of the Nordic cooperation.

### *Responsibility*

The responsibility frame was noticed in several different circumstances. The Nordic countries were for example given the responsibility by the editorial articles to change the EU from the inside and to bring Nordic values to the EU. Another aspect of the responsibility-frame was that the Nordics ought to join the EU so that the Baltic countries would have a chance to join later; the Nordics should according to this frame help the Baltic countries from the inside of the EU. A third frame of responsibility was connected to solidarity with the international society. Some believed that solidarity was best achieved outside the EU; others believed the Nordic countries could help Third World countries better from inside the EU.

### *Nostalgia vs. changes*

This frame presented the EU-referenda as a crossroads, where the Nordic countries had to choose between holding on to an old, nostalgic reality or realising that Europe and Norden had changed or was about to change.

### *Fear vs. courage*

This frame is closely connected to the previous one, but still worth an own frame. For example, many editorials in Aftenposten were filled with fear of what would happen with Norway if it remained outside the union, isolated from its closest neighbours. Dagens Nyheter framed the Finnish Yes-vote as a courageous decision and advised its readers to follow the Finnish neighbours.

### *Self-esteem*


The editorials coded with this frame touched upon the different Nordic countries' belief in themselves and their possibilities to achieve things either within or outside of the EU.

### *Benefits*

This frame highlighted the benefits the Nordic countries would get if they decided to work on an issue together. The spirit of this frame was that one Nordic country is strong but three, four or even five Nordic countries are even stronger. The opposite of this frame is consequently what happens if the Nordic countries chose different paths.

It should be said straight away that a clear-cut division of the editorial articles according to the different themes and frames has not been easy, since most articles contain several themes and frames of nearly equal importance. These articles have been coded according to the most dominant theme and frame. This choice is, however, dependent on my personal adjustments and although I have recoded parts of the material to check the reliability, qualitative choices are always qualitative choices. For that reason, the disposition of the frequency of each theme and frame in the three newspapers, as presented in *Table 5* and *Table 6*, does not really do justice to the content of the articles and the results will therefore be more qualitatively discussed in the next chapter. Generally though, one could say that Nordic values and cooperation were the two predominant themes in Helsingin Sanomat, closely followed by articles on Nordic unity. In Dagens Nyheter, the themes were rather evenly divided, while in Aftenposten most articles dealt with Nordic influence and unity. Since the Norwegians were the last ones to cast their votes, it is not surprising that many articles dealt with the results of the Finnish and Swedish referenda and that the share of articles with influence as the theme therefore was high. The high amount of articles dealing with values, cooperation and unity in the Finnish case, is most likely an expression of the country's desire to profile itself as a Western country with similar values as the other Nordic countries.


**Table 5.** The frequency of different Nordic themes in the three newspapers.





The figure on the Nordic frames below shows that point of reference was a frequent frame in Helsingin Sanomat, Dagens Nyheter and Aftenposten. All three countries thus turn to their neighbours for advice and support. Nostalgia vs. changes was a common frame, especially in Finland, but also in Norway. The Finnish discourse did concentrate much on the fact that for the first time ever the country could decide on its own destiny, without being hold back by any agreements with the Soviet Union, or by this time, Russia.

**Table 6.** The frequency of different Nordic frames in the three newspapers.



The problem with these kinds of dispositions though, is that one easily gets the impression that economy was not at all a Nordic theme in Helsingin Sanomat or in Aftenposten or that there were no articles dealing with the conflict-frame in Dagens Nyheter. In reality, Nordic economy was a visible theme both in HS and AP and there were conflicts in Dagens Nyheter, but in those articles where they appeared, there were other themes and frames, which were stronger, and therefore the article has been coded according to the more dominant theme. In the following chapter, the analysis continues with a more qualitative approach.

### **3 A new Norden in a new Europe**

The dramatic changes in Europe in the late 1980s and the early 1990s had consequences for Norden as well. In the new geopolitical situation, Europe was no longer divided into two, but instead the European Communities and later the European Union grew even stronger. While the old division during the Cold War had enabled Norden to hold a favourable position in the middle of capitalism and communism, it was uncertain what the new situation would carry along. The Nordic countries were economically increasingly dependent on the EU and they also wished to join the tables where the decisions in Europe were made. The 1994 EU-referenda became the turning points for the Nordic countries' approach to the European integration, but the referenda results also made them into turning points in the Nordic reality. After the Finns and Swedes had voted Yes to the EU, the Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland said that these Yes-votes would make 1994 to a memorable year in Nordic and European history.<sup>55</sup> She hoped that Norway would follow its neighbours into the EU, but this did not happen. With the dramatic changes in Europe in mind and the uncertain time that followed, I will now take a closer look at how Norden was presented in the newspapers editorials prior to three Nordic EU-referenda. I will discuss the findings of my research and compare them with earlier writings. The themes and frames presented in the previous chapter will be discussed more in detail together with examples from the source material. The rest of the chapter is divided into three subchapters, each presenting some of the themes and some of the frames. The subchapters are in the same time parts of my results and in this chapter I will therefore argue that 1) Norden never lost value for the Nordics but simply fell out of fashion when the EU became a more attractive alternative, 2) The Nordic interdependence remained strong although the Nordic reality was shaken, 3) The belief that Norden was better than the Others still prevailed.

#### **3.1 Norden valuable but not fashionable**

For the Nordic countries, Norden never stopped being important although Norden's position in the world was somewhat weakened with the end of the Cold War. The problem for Norden was, however, that the EU took over a lot of its attention and

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<sup>55</sup> Gro Harlem Brundtland, cited in "Norge ved skilleveien" in Aftenposten, November 16, 1994, 14.

attractiveness. Norden was still valuable but no longer fashionable.<sup>56</sup> This was seen already in the campaigns prior to the referenda, but even more after the accession of Finland and Sweden in the EU. The EU became, as Pertti Joenniemi expressively formulates it, the “new master narrative”<sup>57</sup>. The weaker position of Norden was for example manifested through a decreased interest for Nordic cooperation. In a report from the Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish Institutes of International Affairs and the University in Reykjavik from 1991, the director of the Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sverre Jervell wrote:

“Parts of the Nordic cooperation-apparatus is politically ticking over and the media-interest for the Nordic Council and Nordic Council of Ministers is limited. The Nordic politicians still care about Nordic cooperation, but they bring it more goodwill than political will. It is not an expression of deliberately giving the Nordic lesser priority, but rather a consequence of the fact that politicians and media are now focusing on the EC and the EEA”.<sup>58</sup> (My translation)

The institutionalized Nordic cooperation, with the Nordic Council from 1952 and the Nordic Council of Ministers from 1971 as the two main bodies, had in the early 1990s lost both significance and the ability to take action. The golden age<sup>59</sup> when the Nordic passport union (1952) and the Nordic labour market (1954) were created and the Helsinki agreement, which stipulates the official Nordic cooperation, came into force (1962) was long gone. The attempt to create a Nordic defence union had failed already in 1948 and the Nordic economic cooperation, Nordek, failed in 1970. Instead, Nordic cooperation was associated with so called soft policy areas, like culture and the environment. With the possibility of suddenly having not only one Nordic country in the EU, but possibly four Nordic countries, it was clear that the EU-referenda, whatever the outcome would be, would have an impact on the future Nordic cooperation. Some felt that the EU posed a threat against the Nordic cooperation, while others saw the EU as an additional arena for cooperation between the Nordic countries.

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<sup>56</sup> See Joenniemi, Pertti (1992): Norden as a Mystery. The Search for New Roads into the Future. In Øberg, Jan (ed.). *Nordic Security in the 1990s. Options in the Changing Europe*. Pinter Publishers, London.

<sup>57</sup> Joenniemi 1992, 74.

<sup>58</sup> Jervell, Sverre (1991): Elementer i en ny nordisk arkitektur. In *Norden i det nye Europa. En rapport fra de fire nordiske utenrikspolitiske instituttene og universitetet i Reykjavik*. Helsingfors, København, Oslo, Reykjavik, Stockholm, 189.

<sup>59</sup> This term was coined by Bengt Sundelius and Claes Wiklund. They describe the three main tracks of Nordic cooperation, from the late 1940s to the turn of the millennium, in Sundelius, Bengt – Wiklund, Claes (ed.) (2000).

In my material there were several newspaper editorials dealing with Nordic cooperation. However, my research shows that the strongest support for strengthened Nordic cooperation was found among the EU-sceptics. Especially Finnish politician Paavo Väyrynen talked warmly about a Nordic union as an alternative to the European Union. The same Väyrynen also made himself known in the other Nordic countries by giving a marathon speech in the Finnish Parliament in order to postpone the Parliament's final approval of the Finnish Yes-vote until after the Swedish referendum had been held. But Väyrynen's idea of a Nordic union was criticised among the EU-supporters, who generally looked upon the idea as a joke. In a press cutting from the Finnish newspaper Kouvola Sanomat, published in Helsingin Sanomat, Väyrynen's proposal of a Nordic union was described as a utopian fantasy,

“[w]here an illusion of a new impressive Nordic cooperation is painted with all the colours of the rainbow”.

(“Ruotsin vaalitulos”, press cutting from Kouvola Sanomat, published in Helsingin Sanomat on September 21, 1994, page A2.)

In another column published in Helsingin Sanomat, the newspaper's own journalist Erkki Pennanen gives a critical view of Nordic cooperation:

“The Nordic countries have much more in common between them than between the EU-countries. The big concrete achievements of the Nordic cooperation have, however, been few since the passport freedom and the creation of the free labour market. (...) The European cooperation drove past the Nordic one. The interest of the Nordic countries shifted to develop the cooperation in broader European forums. A return to the Nordic cooperation would be a step back, which hardly would interest anybody.”

(“Mikä ihmeen ‘Pohjolan yhteisö’?”, column, published in Helsingin Sanomat September 27, 1994, page A2.)

Väyrynen's kind of understanding of Nordic cooperation was consequently framed as nostalgic and reactionary. This verdict fits well with a passage written by Pertti Joenniemi already in 1992: “Norden has connotations referring to the past rather than the future, and it provides a weak shelter against changing conditions in Europe”.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Joenniemi 1992, 78.

Most editorials were, however, not negatively inclined towards Nordic cooperation, but they believed that a deepened cooperation could only be achieved within the European Union. As guest columnist Anna Christensen, professor in civil law in Lund, wrote in Dagens Nyheter two days before the Swedish referendum:

“Certainly, one can regret that the Nordic countries did not manage to create a stronger common political organization. But that train has already left the station. Denmark is already member of the EU since many years back and Finland has already voted yes. If we shall be able to carry through common Nordic politics in the future, it has to be done within the broader political frame, which the EU constitutes.”

(“Europa existerar även på måndag”, guest column, published in Dagens Nyheter November 11, 1994, page A2.)

Future Nordic cooperation was thus framed as something that needed to be changed to fit the new reality, but no one wanted to completely end the cooperation. Instead, the view shared by all three newspapers was that Nordic cooperation could continue to live inside the European Union. Nordic cooperation was also portrayed through the benefit-frame. If Finland, Sweden and Norway cooperate with Denmark, who joined the EU already in 1973, then the Nordic benefits inside the EU would become much bigger. Behind this frame lies an assumption that the Nordic countries share the same interests and priorities, which in most cases is true, but not always. After the Finnish Yes-vote, and later the Swedish ditto, the idea of a Nordic union outside of the EU eventually became impossible, and a strengthened cooperation within the EU was seen as the only option. After the Finnish and the Swedish referenda, the Norden-card was used more than ever by the Yes-supporters in Norway. The day after the Swedish Yes-vote, one editorial article in Aftenposten said:

“It is now up to the Norwegian people to decide, whether we also should participate in the deepening of the Nordic cooperation within the broader, European frame. And it is up to us to decide, whether a gathered Norden shall make a contribution to the shaping of the future Europe”.

(“Overbevisende ja-flertall”, long editorial article, published in Aftenposten November 14, 1994, page 14.)

The courage vs. fear-frame was used more often in Aftenposten than in the other two newspapers, especially during the last days before the Norwegian referendum, when it stood clear that the No-side still was in majority despite the Finnish and Swedish Yes-


votes. The fear of being left outside, or rather of choosing to stay outside, of both the European and the Nordic cooperation led to several editorial articles in Aftenposten about how Norden would be divided if the Norwegians chose to vote No. The editorials gave the impression that the Nordic cooperation had no future outside of the EU and that by turning down the EU, the Norwegians would also turn down the Nordic cooperation.

“During fifty years, first the wars and later the east-west-tension has divided Norden. Now the geopolitical situation no longer puts obstacles in the way for a Nordic cooperation on foreign policy and defence, but possibly we ourselves.”

(“Splittet Norden på EU-tog i fart?”, commentary, published in Aftenposten November, 17, 1994, page 16.)

In Norway, the attitudes towards Norden have been divided before. In the same commentary as cited above, Nils Morten Udgaard reminds the readers that those parties who were against the creation of the Nordic Council in 1952 are the same parties who are now against a Norwegian membership in the EU, namely the Centre Party and the Christian Democratic Party. He asks himself how important Norden actually is for Norway. The feeling mediated through the editorials in Aftenposten is that Norway should follow its Nordic neighbours into the EU. This recommendation is cleverly displayed in a satiric cartoon, published in Aftenposten on November 15. The cartoon, showed in *Figure 2*, is a picture of Norwegian Social Democratic Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, who was a pronounced Yes-supporter, and the “No-Queen” Anne Enger Lahnstein, leader of the Centre Party. Brundtland is portrayed as a big and important person looking down at poor Lahnstein, who is dressed in a traditional Norwegian folk costume, which gives the impression that Lahnstein stands for something old and nostalgic. In her hands, Brundtland carries a vacuum cleaner, whose mouthpiece is shaped as the contours of Norway. The motor of the vacuum cleaner is decorated with the characteristic EU-stars and a face of Jacques Delors, the President of the European Commission at the time. Lahnstein is picking up leaves from the ground, one by one, with a stick, while Brundtlands European vacuum cleaner gives the impression of being much more efficient. The caption underneath the cartoon says: “–Er det ikke på tide at du tar imot et Nordisk Råd?”, which in English would be: “–Is it not about time that you take a Nordic advice/Council?”. The Norwegian (and Swedish) word *råd* means both advice and council in English. Therefore the meaning of the

caption is double. Partly, the message is that Norway should take an advice from the other Nordic countries and join the EU, but since *Nordisk Råd* is written with capital letters in the beginning, it is also referring to the Nordic Council. The Centre Party, which Lahnstein represents, was against the creation of the Nordic Council in the 1950s and at the time of the Norwegian EU-referendum they were against the EU. The message here is to remind No-voters of how well the Nordic cooperation within the Nordic Council has turned out although the Centre Party was sceptical towards it in the beginning and secondly, to imply that the EU will turn out just as well.



**Figure 2.** Cartoon published in Aftenposten on November 15, 1994, page 18.

The examples mentioned above might give the impression that the editorial articles frequently and systematically discussed the future of Nordic cooperation, but the truth is that not many concrete suggestions on how a deepened Nordic cooperation within the EU would look like, were made. Most editorials agreed that the Nordic countries would have a strong political impact inside the EU if they put their votes together and moreover, most of them agreed that the “Nordic interests” were to be defended. Matters concerning the environment, openness, equality and a concern for the Baltic countries were mentioned as possible Nordic priorities within the EU. But the editorials did not

mention any concrete plans for a Nordic programme within the union. This is further evidence to the claim that Norden was valuable but not fashionable. None of the editorials put too much time on outlining the future of the Nordic cooperation, but they all agreed that it was important and should be continued within the EU. Many researchers at the time suggested that the Nordic cooperation could be revitalised by including the Baltic countries in the cooperation. In his 1992 article, *Nordic Nostalgia: Northern Europe after the Cold War*, Ole Wæver suggests a Baltic rearticulation of Norden as the only option.<sup>61</sup> To him, Norden represents the old and the Baltic the new. Moreover, cooperation in the Baltic region would not be state-based as the Nordic cooperation but include the whole region around the Baltic Sea. Thirdly, this new cooperation would create a growth region needed to manage in the economic competition in Europe.<sup>62</sup> The Nordic Council of Ministers did open own offices in the Baltic countries Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1991,<sup>63</sup> and cooperation between the Nordics and Baltics began, but this was not an option discussed in my sources. The editorials did express a concern for the Baltic neighbours, but none of the editorials suggested that the Nordic cooperation would be expanded to also include the Baltics.

The countries voted for or against EU-membership on national grounds, not Nordic. The talks about Nordic cooperation could therefore only serve as a reinforcing argument. For the EU-supporters, the aim was to assure the voters that the Nordic countries would continue to accompany each other also inside the European Union. For the EU-opponents, on the other hand, Nordic cooperation was used as an alternative to the EU. I found it striking that, in Dagens Nyheter, the Nordic bloc within the EU was given more political weight after the Norwegians had voted No to EU-membership than during the campaigns. In an editorial article two days after the Norwegian vote, DN wrote:

“One of the points with parallel membership-negotiations was to form a strong Nordic bloc with great opportunities to influence on the development of the EU. (...) The dream about an intensified Nordic cooperation within the frame of the union stays at a dream with Norway outside”.

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<sup>61</sup> Wæver 1992a, 96-97.

<sup>62</sup> Wæver 1992a, 96-97.

<sup>63</sup> Nordic Council and Nordic Council of Ministers (2012a): *Nordic co-operation with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania*, website.



(“Landet Annorlunda utanför”, long editorial article, published in Dagens Nyheter November 30, 1994, page A2.)

If the editorials had talked more about what this Nordic bloc concretely could achieve prior to the referenda, and not after the referenda, the Norwegian results could have turned out differently. However, editorial articles usually comment on statements or actions made by politicians, and if the politicians did not go into detail on the plans of the Nordic bloc, then it is not surprising that the editorials did not either. One of the reasons why the plan of a Nordic bloc inside the EU was not developed as thoroughly as it could have, was perhaps that the Nordic politicians did not want to scare the other EU-members with far-reaching plans of a bloc that would make the Nordics very powerful. Bloc creations inside the EU are generally looked upon with disapproval. But, as already mentioned, the referenda were national referenda, not common Nordic ones. Nordic interests are valuable for the Nordic countries, but not more valuable than the national ones. If there is a conflict between Nordic and national values, the national will win. The Nordic aspect is nevertheless seen as a valuable additional level, between the national and international.

### **3.2 The strong Nordic interdependence: All for one, one for all?**

Another finding I did from my sources was that although the new geopolitical situation in Europe and the changes that followed with it might have reduced Norden's significance in Europe, the interdependence between the Nordic countries remained strong. The editorial articles frequently referred to Norden as a point of reference and a source of comparison. The point of reference-frame was by far the most common frame used in all three newspapers and Nordic unity was the most common theme in the articles dealing with Norden. This unity was expressed through feelings of a special togetherness, different from others, but also through a reference of the Nordic countries being united through similar society structures, values, experiences and preconditions. For instance, the editorial articles could refer to another Nordic country as “brother”, or “closest neighbour”. The cartoon in *Figure 3* below is a perfect example of how Norden was viewed as a family. In the cartoon, which was published in Helsingin Sanomat on November 15, 1994, Denmark, Sweden and Finland are already sitting in the boat, wondering if Norway is joining them or not. Viking chief Hågar the Horrible is sitting on the bridge in the same position as Auguste Rodin's sculpture *The Thinker*, pondering

over what to do. In his hands he has a mug of oil (not *øl*, the Norwegian word for beer). He seems to be wondering what is more important, to follow his family or to try to stand on his own feet? The reference to the comic-strip character Hågar the Horrible is inventive since it is a character that most readers are familiar with. In addition, it gives the impression that the Nordic family has existed since the Viking Age, which certainly is not true. It was not before the 1830s, after fighting several wars against each other, that a movement of cooperation between the three Scandinavian countries Sweden, Denmark and Norway started taking place. This pan-Scandinavian movement did not lead to any concrete institutions, but as time went by, it led to cooperation with cultural as well as vocational features.<sup>64</sup> This movement could be seen as a precursor of the cooperation within the Association for Nordic Unity, created in 1919 and the institutionalised Nordic cooperation, developed in the early 1950s.



**Figure 3.** Cartoon published in Helsingin Sanomat on November 15, 1994, page A2.

In the analysed editorial articles, the Danish experiences of the EU were naturally used as examples of how a future EU-membership could be. The EU-supporters claimed that a membership would not mean that the Nordic countries would have to lower their level of welfare and they pointed to Denmark as an example of a EU-country with high welfare standards.

<sup>64</sup> See Hemstad, Ruth (2005): Skandinavismen og 1905. Fra Indian Summer til nordisk vinter. In *Nordisk Tidsskrift för Vetenskap, Konst och Industri*. Utgiven av Letterstedtska föreningen. VTT Grafiska Vimmerby, Stockholm, 2005, 81 (1).

“When we are frightened about losing our independence and our originality, about floods of foreigners and the collapse of our social security, it is worth looking towards Denmark. The EU has not crushed the Danish welfare model, neither has it brought flocks of free riders to the country to enjoy the high social security or to hoard everything they come across.”

(“Tanskan uusi taudinmääritys”, press cutting from Aamulehti, published in Helsingin Sanomat September 24, 1994, page A2.)

Denmark was also used as an example of how joining the EU does not mean that a country loses its right of self-determination and its identity.

“[a]lso the No-side has to note that Denmark, despite many years of membership, is still a democracy where Folketinget<sup>65</sup> still is influential, and still a country where one can enjoy smörrebröd<sup>66</sup>, red sausages and beer.”

(“Debatt om EU gynnar jäsidan”, short editorial article, published in Dagens Nyheter October 21, 1994, page A2.)

Among Yes-supporters, Denmark served as an example of the possibility to combine a EU-membership with national and Nordic characteristics. EU was to them not a threat against the Nordic, but rather a complement or an additional level. The arguments of the No-side were also visible in the newspapers, but mainly when they were discussed and scrutinized by the journalists of the three newspapers in my material. The parallel to Denmark was, nevertheless, also seen among the EU-opponents. For instance, Norwegian Centre Party leader Anne Enger Lahnstein claimed that Finland and Sweden, similarly to Denmark, would cease to exist as independent countries after joining the EU. In this case, Denmark served as a bad example.

Not only Denmark was used as a point of reference, comparisons were also made between the other Nordic countries. Especially the importance of the polls prior to the referenda and the results after the referenda were discussed. The No-side in the three countries had criticized the order of the three referenda, where the least sceptical Finns voted first, followed by the Swedes and leaving the most sceptical Norwegians to vote last. This order was thought to create a domino effect, where a Finnish Yes would result in a Swedish Yes, which in turn would lead to a Norwegian Yes. In the editorial pages, however, the opinions on this matter were divided. In a column in Helsingin Sanomat,

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<sup>65</sup> Folketinget is the Danish Parliament. Literally, Folketinget means the People’s Thing, thing being the governing assembly.

<sup>66</sup> Smörrebröd, or in Danish, Smørrebrød are famous Danish sandwiches.

the newspaper's own journalist Erkki Pennanen wrote that the opposition against the EU is so strong in Norway that a Finnish and Swedish membership hardly is enough to change the Norwegians' minds. According to him, the Norwegians were ready to walk their own way without caring about the other Nordics. The membership in Nato and the country's oil profits gave Norway totally other prerequisites than Finland and Sweden. Pennanen was critical against the old, outmoded cooperation within Norden, but believed that the possible EU-accessions would give new strength to Norden. He was upset over the fact that Sweden applied for EU-membership without first consulting or even informing Finland.

“When Sweden submitted its EU-application, it did not inform Finland or Norway about it in advance. It wanted to secure the best place in the queue for itself. In the same way official Finland is ready to go its own way, even though Sweden and Norway would be left outside”.

(“Mikä ihmeen “Pohjolan yhteisö”?”, column, published in Helsingin Sanomat, September 27, 1994, page A2.)

Certainly, the Nordic countries have not always been of the same opinion and have not had the same starting positions either. Norden consists of five different countries, but there exists a unity between them, which is not found between just any countries. If Finland was hurt because Sweden did not inform of its intention to apply for EU-membership, then Finland was hurt because it felt closeness to Sweden and had wished that the countries would approach the EU together. But apart from unity, this is also an example of the interdependence between the countries. Decisions made by one Nordic country have consequences for the others. Norway would hardly have submitted its EU-application in 1992 if it had not been for the Swedish and Finnish applications. The editorial articles that discussed this type of dependence were labelled with the influence-theme. Partly this theme was seen in articles lifting up how Norden could influence the rest of the EU, this aspect will be discussed further later on, but it was also seen in articles, which talked about how the Nordic countries influence each other internally. In this context, it was mainly the EU-candidates Finland, Sweden and Norway who influenced each other's EU-campaigns, but as already mentioned the Danish experiences were also influential.

In Finland, a long-lasting wish to finally become a part of Western Europe like the other Nordic countries was combined with the opportunity of finally deciding on its own

destiny. After being hold back by the Fenno-Soviet Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance for several decades, the Finns were eager to join the EU, even though it meant diverging from Sweden and Norway. After the Finns had voted Yes to EU-membership on October 16, 1994, the debate in Dagens Nyheter was heavily concerned with the consequences of the Finnish Yes for Sweden. The tone in the editorial pages concerning the results was admiring, yet conscious. The little brother Finland had made a courageous decision and shown the way for Sweden. The courage vs. fear-frame was clearly visible. Now Sweden would have to follow Finland as not to lose status or economic benefits. Economy was a frequent theme in the Swedish articles after the Finnish referendum. The main concern applied to the forestry industry. With similar natural resources, Finland and Sweden were competitors in the forestry industry export market. After it became clear that Finland would join the EU, worried voices were raised in Sweden about the possible advantages the membership would mean for Finland.

“For Swedish economy, it becomes even more evident that isolation is strange. Finnish forestry industry, the toughest competitor to the Swedish forestry industry, would be spared from time-consuming border controls during transports to the continent, while the problem would remain for the Swedish one. Unlike the Swedish one, the Finnish forestry industry would gain influence in the EU rules and regulations for forestry industries.”

(“Nytt läge inför svenska folkomröstningen”, short editorial, published in Dagens Nyheter October 18, 1994, page A2.)

Also in Norway, the economy-theme was visible, but here the economic concerns were mainly related to a possible Swedish EU-membership. There was a fear that Norwegian companies would move their businesses to Sweden in the case that Sweden would join the union and Norway would vote No, and this would result in increased unemployment in Norway. This fear even had an own name, *svenskesuget*, which in English would be translated to the “Swedosuction” or the “Swedish sucking effect”. In practice, *svenskesuget* meant that Sweden would attract and absorb Norwegian companies. This concept was mainly used by the Yes-side to scare No-voters, while No-supporters tried to minimize the importance of *svenskesuget*. Such an attempt by No-supporter and party leader Kjell Magne Bondevik of the Christian Democratic Party was in turn criticized in an editorial text in Aftenposten.

“Reality is also far away when Bondevik claims that it is important to note that «svenskesuget is psychology and not based on realities». Is there a more solid political reality for Norway today than the Swedish membership in the EU?”

(“Bondevik”, short editorial, published in Aftenposten November 15, 1994, page 18.)

Interestingly enough, the Nordic unity seldom seemed to stretch as far as to Iceland. The result of a No-vote in any of the three countries would mean a continued membership in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and cooperation through the European Economic Area (EEA). The tone in most of the editorials was, however, that it would be an unwished destiny to remain in the EFTA with leftover-countries like Iceland and Liechtenstein. Not even in the Norwegian newspaper were there any grand solidarity declarations towards Iceland, although Norway and Iceland have the vital fishing industry in common. On the whole, Iceland received very little attention in my material. Instead, the core or the motor of Norden was in many aspects concentrated to Sweden. Although the Finns were to hold their referendum first, the expected results of the Swedish referendum received a lot of attention in Finnish media. The influence-theme was once again visible. In a press cutting from the Finnish newspaper Ilkka, published in Helsingin Sanomat, it says:

“Finland’s position in the union or outside of the union naturally depends vitally on the Swedish position”.

(“EU-keskustelusta sekamelskaa”, press cutting from Ilkka, published in Helsingin Sanomat on September 23, 1994, page A2.)

This understanding was also common among the Swedes themselves. The author P.C Jersild, wrote in a guest column in Dagens Nyheter:

“If I were a Finn I would also like Sweden to join the EU. It would feel safer with Sweden as backup and as a bridge down to Europe”.

(“Från kol och stål till mjöl och fläsk”, guest column, published in Dagens Nyheter on November 6, 1994, page A2.)

These examples show that some kind of Swedish guardianship over the rest of Norden still existed, although Finland stopped being a part of the Swedish realm in 1809 and the Union between Sweden and Norway was dissolved in 1905. Both Norway and Finland looked up to Sweden as two little brothers look up to their big brother. But although Sweden had submitted its EU-application first of the three countries, it was little brother

Finland who first approved of the negotiated membership-agreement. The old tendencies of Swedish superiority in Norden were still visible, but a reorientation was underway. After the Finnish Yes-vote, the editorial articles in Dagens Nyheter expressed pride over Finland's courageous decision, but in the same time fear over Sweden's position as the leading Nordic country being over. Especially during the Cold War, Sweden had felt a responsibility over its neighbour Finland, which held the less pleasant role as a buffer zone between Sweden and the Soviet Union. Sweden did not want to upset the Soviet Union, in case this latter would take out its irritation on Finland. After the Finnish Yes-vote, a Swedish No to European integration out of respect for Finland was no longer necessary.

“A central element in Swedish neutrality policy – that we should sit still in the boat as not to create troubles around Finland – disappears when Finland itself searches also its security anchorage in the west”.

(“Nytt läge inför den svenska folkomröstningen”, short editorial article, published in Dagens Nyheter October 18, 1994, page A2.)

Concerning the security policy in Norden, the situation changed somewhat when the Cold War ended. A redefinition of the concept neutrality made it possible for the neutral countries Sweden and Finland to apply for EU-membership, but the two countries continued to attach great weight to their policies of non-alignment. The security policy played an important role in especially the Finnish EU-debate, but it was rarely connected with articles on Norden and has therefore not been included in this material. However, the few editorials in my sources that are coded with the security policy-theme mentioned that Finland and Sweden would try to remain non-aligned and they would not rush defence issues if they joined the EU. The articles in Aftenposten on the other hand, were worried that a Norwegian No would mean that the country would be marginalised despite its Nato-membership. One editorial article in Aftenposten refers to a meeting of the Nordic Ministers of Defence, where an agreement on cooperation on security policy issues was signed. The article expressed a worry that a Norwegian No to the EU would render the agreement difficult.

“And the possible Nordic division will in that case coincide with the time when the Nordic countries have laid down the general outlines for a cooperation agreement on production, acquisition and the utilization of defence materiel. The agreement is an historic event, which

suggests that the foreign- and security policy divisions in Norden shall remain as a fairy tale only”.

(“Norge klassens sinke?”, short editorial article, published in Aftenposten on November 24, 1994, page 18.)

Aftenposten believed that a reorientation of Norden was underway and that Finland had taken the helm. The newspaper found it significant that it was the Finnish Minister for Defence, Elisabeth Rehn, who gave the conclusion at the Defence Ministers’ meeting.

“That it would be her, who gave the conclusion, was illustrative both for the Finnish and the Nordic reorientation in relation to the European Community”.

(“Norge klassens sinke?”, short editorial article, published in Aftenposten on November 24, 1994, page 18.)

The close connection between the political elite in the Nordic countries had a big impact on the sense of unity between the countries. Sweden, Norway and Denmark were all led by Social Democratic Prime Ministers at the time of the referenda, while Finland was lead by Prime Minister Esko Aho of the Centre Party. How close the connections really were, is, however, not evident from my sources. Certainly, the editorials mention politicians from different Nordic countries offering each other help in the election campaigns. But it is also reasonable to assume that the media was not always aware of the deliberations held between the Nordic leaders, as the latter did not want the rest of the EU-countries to worry too much about a creation of a Nordic bloc within the EU.

In a satiric cartoon published in Aftenposten on November 12, 1994, the day before the Swedish referendum, the newspaper highlights the unity among the Nordic political elite. In the drawing, which is shown in *Figure 3*, Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson is standing on a traditional Swedish Dalecarlian Horse (Swedish: *dalahäst*). The painted wooden horse is one of the most famous symbols for Sweden, but it is not very good at jumping. Therefore, Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland is standing next to Carlsson yelling “HYPP! HYPP!”, which in English means, “JUMP! JUMP!” On the other side of the horse is Norwegian Centre Party leader Anne Enger Lahnstein, portrayed as an angry cat. This whole event takes place in an arena, where the audience consist of both Yes- and No-supporters to the EU. Three Nordic flags are displayed at the arena. The Finnish one is already encircled by the EU-stars, while the Swedish and Norwegian flags, in other words the people, soon will have to choose



sides. In the arena, the letters “N” and “ORDIC” are written on a wall, which gives the impression of the event being the Nordic Championships in EU-membership.



**Figure 4.** Cartoon published in Aftenposten on November 12, 1994, page 6.

Indeed, both Carlsson and Brundtland had a tough task to convince their Social Democratic voters to vote for EU-membership. In Sweden, Social Democracy and neutrality had been closely connected for such a long time, that Carlsson’s U-turn in the EU-matter in 1990 was hard to digest for the voters. The Swedish membership negotiations advanced during the rightwing coalition government lead by Carl Bildt, but Carlsson recaptured the Prime Minister post after the Parliamentary elections in September 1994, only two months before the EU referenda. Both Carlsson in Sweden and Brundtland in Norway put a lot of own prestige in the EU-matter, but both of them guarded themselves as well. Carlsson had appointed two influential No-supporters in his Social Democratic government, Minister for Agriculture Margareta Winberg and Minister of Public Administration Marita Ulvskog. Brundtland ensured that she would stay on the Prime Minister post whatever the outcome of the Norwegian referendum would be. In Finland, Prime Minister Esko Aho was criticized for not being clear enough with his opinion concerning the EU. In a column, Helsingin Sanomat’s

journalist Erkki Pennanen compared the three Prime Ministers' approach to the EU-question.

"His [Esko Aho's] position is, that "the EU-question will be taken care of, if it needs to be taken care of", as he said in an interview in Kaleva on Saturday. Aho does not want to go into an open campaign, as for example the President has. (...) The Swedish and Norwegian Prime Ministers are campaigning vigorously for what they personally believe in and what they see is favourable for their country".

("Carlsson ja Gro uskaltavat panna itsensä likoon", column, published in Helsingin Sanomat, September 21, 1994, page A2.)

Some editorial articles overlooked the Nordic interdependence-element and instead emphasized the importance of each Nordic country doing what is best for it. In a guest column in Helsingin Sanomat, Paul Lillrank wrote that Finland should finally break loose from the Swedish mental superiority. Lillrank, who at the time was professor at both the Stockholm School of Economics and at the Helsinki University of Technology, claimed that Sweden's state economy and reputation in the world had collapsed and that Finland ought to seek itself closer to both Europe and its sister nation Estonia. Concerning Nordic cooperation, Lillrank wrote:

"In this situation, the proposed Nordic cooperation as an alternative to the EU would mean that Finland would lash itself together with a sinking ship".

("Ruotsin serkusta Viron veljeksi", guest column, published in Helsingin Sanomat on September 20, 1994, page A2.)

In contrast to Sweden, Finland had, in Lillrank's opinion, always been a poor country. Following this reasoning, the economic crisis in the early 1990s hit Sweden worse than Finland, since Finland was used to manage with less while in Sweden the prosperity had continued through generations. Lillrank's reasoning is interesting. It seems fair to say that Sweden had more at stake in the EU-referenda than Finland. The economic crisis in the early 1990s led to cutbacks in the welfare system, which the Swedes had been so proud of. The Swedish neutrality policy also suddenly lost significance. In other words, it was not only Norden's self-esteem that was challenged, but to a large extent also Sweden's. On top of it all, little brother Finland, who had nothing to lose and everything to win, started raising its voice also in Nordic contexts.

Despite the fluctuating hierarchy between the Nordic countries, depending on subject and time, and despite the somewhat different priorities of Finland, Sweden and Norway, the editorials articles showed that the Nordic interdependence was still strong. Even though it was possible that Norden was losing some of its significance as a model for the rest of Europe, Norden still remained as an important point of reference within the Nordic countries.

### **3.3 Norden still better than the Others**

The reputation, which the Nordic countries had in Europe and in the world during the Cold War, was largely due to an admiration of Nordic values, such as a high level of welfare, neutrality, equality, solidarity and openness. This reputation had in turn built up and maintained the Nordic self-image. When the neutrality was no longer needed and the Nordic welfare system was threatened by economic cutbacks in the early 1990s, the Nordic self-image was challenged. Ole Wæver wrote, “What appears as ”progressive” nowadays is the integrating, market-based, cooperative, sovereignty-neglecting *Europe*, not the distancing, Third Way, self-protecting, global and inward-oriented *Norden* of sovereign states”.<sup>67</sup> This statement seems a bit harsh and does not find support in my sources. A rearticulation of Norden was, nevertheless, underway and the Nordic values and the closely connected Nordic priorities were therefore a natural ingredient in the debates in the campaigns prior to the 1994 EU-elections. Contrary to theories like the one presented by Wæver above, my research suggests that the Nordic values were still viewed as important and even better than European values. As briefly discussed in the passage about the Danish experiences in the previous chapter, there was a concern in Finland, Sweden and Norway that a EU-membership would force the countries to lower their welfare standards to meet the European level. This was an important argument among No-supporters, while Yes-supporters tried to reduce such worries. For instance, Member of the Finnish Parliament, Maija Perho-Santala of the National Coalition Party tried to answer such concerns in a guest column in Helsingin Sanomat. Perho-Santala, who was also a member of the Social Affairs and Health Committee in the Finnish Parliament, wrote that the EU does not have any jurisdiction in social security matters and that a EU-membership, on the contrary, would guarantee

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<sup>67</sup> Wæver, Ole (1992b): Norden rearticulated. In Øberg, Jan (ed.). *Nordic Security in the 1990s. Options in the Changing Europe*. Pinter Publishers, London, 135.

Finland a stable economy to keep the social welfare level high. Moreover, she pointed out that there is a demand for the Nordic welfare society model in the EU.

“Many trade unions and women- and civil rights movements in the EU-countries set a lot of hope to Norden’s accession and the example it can give”.

(“EU ei määrää sosiaaliturvamme”, guest column published in Helsingin Sanomat on October 2, 1994, page A2.)

Journalist Olli Kivinen wrote in a column in Helsingin Sanomat:

“The defence of the Nordic model is important, because the Nordic countries have succeeded to create the best composition for a society so far in history. Finland and Sweden need to find a new boost to their economies to preserve the foundation of the welfare state. Norway does not have the same concerns thanks to their enormous oil money. (...) The key word for the defence of the economy and the welfare model is supervision of national interests. To be able to secure our interests, we have to get to the table where the decisions are made”.

(“Suomen valinta”, column, published in Helsingin Sanomat on October 13, 1994, page A2.)

In an attempt to flatter the Finnish voters, Gabriel Fragniere, the principal of the prestigious College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium wrote:

“We need the Nordic traditions that Finland carefully nurtures, to eliminate the union’s criticised democratic deficit and to promote the openness of the decision process”.

(“EU-Suomesta Itämeri-alueen keskus”, guest column, published in Helsingin Sanomat on October 8, 1994, page A2.)

Thus, the understanding that there existed typical Nordic values still prevailed, despite the alleged crisis in the Nordic identity. This was noticed both among the Nordics themselves, as well as among other Europeans. The conflict-frame was visible when Nordic values were put against Southern European values. Since the newspapers in my analysis were pro-EU, they saw EU-membership as a necessity to maintain a stable economy, which was needed to finance the welfare state. But another reason of joining the EU was to spread the Nordic values to other countries or try to change the EU from the inside. In the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter, the Nordic values and priorities were intrinsically connected with responsibility. Norden, or more precisely Sweden, should bring its values to the rest of Europe in order to make the EU a better and more Swedish place. Anna Christensen, professor of civil law wrote in a guest column in DN:

“It is not the Swedes, who have created the EU, and maybe we would have wanted the political organisation in Europe to be differently shaped. But we cannot create an alternative EU according to the Swedish or Nordic model. The EU is already there. (...) Our possibilities to exercise some kind of political influence on a European level presuppose us joining the political organisation that exists and trying to influence it from the inside”.

(“Europa existerar även på måndag”, guest column published in Dagens Nyheter on November 11, 1994, page A2.)

Dagens Nyheter used the responsibility-frame more frequently than the Finnish and Norwegian newspapers. The editorial articles in DN repeatedly talked about the responsibility Sweden had towards the rest of Europe. They meant that if Sweden says No to the EU, many countries will be disappointed, not least the Baltic countries who saw the Nordic accessions as a step closer to the EU for them as well. According to the Swedish editorials, a Finnish No would be understandable because of the agriculture and a Norwegian No would be understandable because of the oil and the Nato-membership, but a Swedish No would only be an expression of Swedish introspectiveness and nostalgia. If the Nordics said No, it would also mean more power to the Southern European countries:

“If the countries in the North abdicate from such a responsibility it means in practice that we give away the equivalent amount of influence to other countries. (...) Somewhat brutally, one can say that the entry of the EFTA-countries in the EU is expected to reduce the influence Southern European, Latin and protectionist countries have on the European future, and therefore contribute to the development of Europe in a direction that is more in line with the interests and values in Northern Europe”.

(“Vårt ansvar för Europa”, press cutting from Ekonomisk debatt published in Dagens Nyheter on October 16, 1994, page A2.)

This kind of rhetoric clearly indicates a difference between Norden and others, in this case, Southern European countries. It also suggests that the Nordic interests and values are better than others. It is not surprising, that the passage above comes from a Swedish newspaper. At least when it comes to values, the feeling in the Swedish debate seemed more focused on what Sweden could do for Europe than what Europe could do for Sweden. The same thing applies to the Norwegian debate, but to a much lesser extent, while editorials in the Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat talked more about what a EU-membership would signify for Finland. In this case, the countries’ different

histories were clearly visible in the debate. Sweden, with a history of being a great power in Europe and later associated with the famous Swedish middle way, modernity and prosperity had a strong belief itself. Norway had for a long time been a poor country under both Danish and Swedish rule, but a strong nationalism and an economically stable situation due to the money generated by the oil industry boosted the Norwegian self-esteem. Finland did not gain its independence from Russia until 1917 and after that followed a civil war and later two wars against the Soviet Union. The Fenno-Soviet Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance also limited the Finnish abilities to take action from 1948 until 1991, when the Soviet Union was dissolved and Finland gave notice of the agreement. Naturally, the Finns had had a shorter period of time to develop and nourish their self-esteem, but this was helped up by an eager wish to become a part of Western Europe. In the Swedish case, the belief in the own country sometimes took absurd proportions. One editorial article referred to this as the superiority complex. The point was that the Swedes' perception of their standard of living made them look down on others. In fact, the economic crisis had already lowered the Swedish level of welfare, but the old perception of Sweden still prevailed among the Swedes. One editorial article in DN struck me, although it is not included in the material since it did not cover Norden in any way. It was an article relating to the domestic debate in Sweden about different arguments on the Yes- and No-side. DN, which was a pronounced Yes-newspaper, criticized how the No-side in Sweden seemed to have a strong ideal picture of Sweden as the country with the best welfare, the best food, the best environment and openness, among other things. DN did not seem to be aware that the Yes-side also idealised Sweden, certainly not as obvious as the No-side, but still much more than Finland or Norway did. For instance, in an editorial article about the new European Commission and its President Jacques Santer, DN wrote:

“The President sounds sympathetic when he remarkably “Swedish” talks for openness, equality, friendliness towards the environment and institutions closer to the people”.

(“En vänlig knuff från Santer”, long editorial article published in Dagens Nyheter on October 31, 1994, page A2.)

Thus, Dagens Nyheter often referred to values such as openness, equality and democracy as typical Swedish values, while in Helsingin Sanomat and Aftenposten the same values were referred to as Nordic values. This is also the case with the Swedish

versus the Nordic model. DN talks more about the Swedish model, while HS and AP talk about the Nordic model. It is true that the Swedish model was a concept, but it eventually developed into the Nordic model when the other Nordic countries started building up their societies in a similar way. Hans Mouritzen claims, “‘Swedish’ and ‘Nordic’ have often been confused, making the other Nordic countries free riders on the model”.<sup>68</sup> The two concepts are now more or less used parallelly.

The Nordic welfare model naturally received a lot of attention, but the Nordic concerns for transparency in public administration, gender equality and the environment were also noticed. Environment was mentioned in several editorials, but there were very few articles where the environment was the most dominant theme. The number of articles coded with the environment as the main theme was therefore not high, but the debate about the environment was, nevertheless, visible in all three countries. Most editorials agreed that the environmental problems were so large that they needed to be addressed internationally. The environmental priorities between the different Nordic countries, however, differed somewhat, as the following passage from Aftenposten shows:

“If Norway, Sweden and Finland become members, then the Kola peninsula will become a neighbourhood of the EU. An own cleanup-program and an own Kola-foundation. Sweden and Finland are, however, more interested in the EU engaging in the Baltic Sea, in the Baltic countries and in the Saint Petersburg-area. The EU:s engagement in the Kola peninsula will therefore largely depend on Norway’s future connection to the union”.

(“Blir atom-trusselen EUs ansvar?”, commentary published in Aftenposten on October 18, 1994, page 14.)

The No-supporters in Finland, Sweden and Norway pretty much used the same arguments as the Yes-supporters when it came to values, but they interpreted them differently. No-supporters believed that the Nordic values would be best defended outside of the EU. Mikko Vesa, the president of the *Young people’s EU-Forum* (Nuorten EU-foorum), wrote in a guest column in HS:

“In Norden, democracy goes together with openness in the public decision-making process. The European Union is not a democratic organisation, and it does not respect the principle of transparency. (...) Why then, would not the Nordic countries join the union and change it? In my opinion, we have to be realistic; our influence would be very little and secondly, if the

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<sup>68</sup> Mouritzen, Hans (1995): The Nordic Model as a Foreign Policy Instrument: Its Rise and Fall. In *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 32, No.1, 12.

union would have a need to change according to our model, this would have happened already in connection with the Maastricht process.

(“Parempi Eurooppa ihmisten ehdoilla”, guest column published in Helsingin Sanomat on October 1, 1994, page A2.)

The responsibility-frame was also frequently used by No-supporters, but in a totally different way than the Yes-side used it. While the Yes-side talked about a responsibility to bring Nordic values to the rest of Europe, the No-side argued that Norden should take responsibility for the Third World by staying outside of the EU. Thomas Wallgren, research assistant at the Academy of Finland and president of the *Yes to the World – No thank you to the EU Forum* (Kyllä maailmalle – kiitos ei EU:lle-foorum), wrote in a guest column in HS:

“Outside of the EU, Finland maintains the possibility to hold on to the pretension to respect all people equally and cherish a world wide solidarity”.

(“EU edustaa länttä varsin heikosti”, guest column published in Helsingin Sanomat on September 25, 1994, page A2.)

Similarly, in one of the few EU-critical texts published in Aftenposten during the last month before the EU-referenda, Aina Edelmann, chairwoman of *Norwegian Farmers and Smallholders Union* (Norges Bonde- og Småbrukarlag), wrote:

“The question, which is raised, is therefore if we in Norway see the opportunity and the challenge that lies in standing outside the strong bloc creation precisely to be able to continue the important role as a bridge-builder – both to the East and to the South”.

(“Norge og EU-blokken”, guest column published in Aftenposten on November 18, 1994, page 14.)

The concern for the Third World had according to Ole Wæver traditionally been one of the main components of the Nordic identity, together with being a low-tension area in security policy terms and offering a model for the welfare society. Whereas the end of the Cold War made most of Europe into a low-tension area and welfare systems started to become quite well spread all over Europe, Wæver saw the concern of the Third World as something that could possibly save some Nordism in the process of Europeanization.<sup>69</sup> In my material, the concern for the Third World did not receive a lot of attention, and when it did, it was in two EU-critical guest columns. This does of

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<sup>69</sup> Wæver 1992a, 84-87.



course not mean that the Yes-side lacked a concern for the Third World, but my sources indicates that it was not one of the most important features ascribed to Norden and therefore my material tell against Wæver's theory on this point.

Religion was not a very common theme either. Lutheranism is the main faith in all three countries, all though the societies are largely secularised. In Norway, the church leaders were openly against EU-membership while their colleagues in Sweden and Finland were pro-EU. This difference led to a couple of articles in *Aftenposten*, which pointed to the historically close connection between Christianity and the shaping of Europe. The newspaper thought it was strange that the churches in Norway were against a cooperating Europe, while churches in other European countries work for solidarity between the countries. In the Finnish and Swedish newspapers, religion received even less attention. A parallel to the Nordic work ethic was, however, drawn in *Helsingin Sanomat*. Although the Nordic countries are largely secularised, the Lutheran heritage lives on in the protestant work ethic. In a column, journalist Erkki Pennanen tries to reduce the No-side's frightening arguments about the bureaucracy in Brussels by instead calling Finland the Promised Land of directives. According to him, Euro directives are best followed in Denmark of all the EU-countries, but in his mind, Finland and Sweden are probably even more conscious bearers of the Nordic work ethic and law-abidingness. He fears that the Finnish bureaucracy will take the Euro directives much more seriously than elsewhere.

“In the countries at the Mediterranean the mentality is completely different. According to some claims, there has been no time or interest to translate parts of the directives, to for example Greek. Over there the directives are thus not known, and of course not followed (...) this does not mean that our bureaucracy should compromise the high Nordic work ethic and law-abidingness. But when we join such a big international community as the EU we need to learn to function according to the same rules as the others. That also applies to the status of directives and the following of them”.

(“Suomi on direkttiivien luvattu maa”, column published in *Helsingin Sanomat* on October 12, 1994, page A2.)

It seems as if Pennanen appreciated Nordic values, but in the same time thought that Finland should adapt to the rules in the EU. Once again, this is an indication of the Finnish eagerness to join the EU and secondly, that the Finnish self-esteem was less developed than the Swedish and Norwegian ones. While the feeling in most of the

editorial articles in Dagens Nyheter was that the EU should adapt to Swedish and Nordic rules, the feeling in Helsingin Sanomat was more submissive. Certainly, the Finnish editorials also expressed pride over Nordic values, but they were also coloured by realist politics. In Norway, Nordic values received surprisingly little attention. It seems reasonable that the country's oil money made Norway less dependent of the EU to maintain a stable economy, which in turn was needed to finance the welfare system. The welfare system was not as threatened in Norway as it was in Finland and Sweden and therefore it needed not to be defended as much either. The main fear in Norway was connected with being isolated and marginalised. In Norway, the Nordic unity was more important than the Nordic values. The tone in Aftenposten was more defensive than in Helsingin Sanomat and Dagens Nyheter. A large share of the editorial articles used their space in the newspaper to answer to the critique from the No-side and to try to show the inaccuracies in the No-supporters' rhetoric. This can be explained by the larger share of No-supporters in Norway than in the other two countries. Editorial articles critical to the EU were also more rare in Aftenposten than in the two other newspapers. While the editorials in Aftenposten generally had a defensive character, the editorials in Dagens Nyheter and Helsingin Sanomat concentrated more on the future.

## 4 A Changing Nordic identity?

The Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian responses to the changes in Europe at the shift of the decade were ultimately the EU-referenda in the autumn of 1994. The previous reluctance or incapacity to join the European integration project was not as prominent as before in these three countries. They had become increasingly dependent on the EU and they wanted to join the decision-making processes within the union. In the 1990s, it was popular among researchers to claim that the end of the Cold War had made Norden and the Nordic values lose some of its significance in the world and that Norden therefore had fallen into an identity crisis. So did for example Ole Wæver. As my findings in the previous chapter indicate, the belief in Norden was still strong in the editorial articles written the last month before the referenda. My findings therefore make me question how serious this Nordic identity crisis really was. To be able to answer that we have to take a closer look at what one can mean with Nordic identity.

The concept Nordic identity indicates sameness between the five Nordic countries Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Pertti Joenniemi describes Norden as a common value system, which originates from the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>70</sup> According to him, Norden constituted an alternative during the build-up-period of the nation-states. In this process, the nation-states won, but instead of disappearing, Norden remained as a sphere by the side of the nation-states.<sup>71</sup> In the book *The Cultural Construction of Norden*, the editors Bo Stråth and Øystein Sørensen ask themselves what Norden really is. Their answer is that, apart from being a geographical area, Norden also exists as a construction based on history and that the bricks in this construction are the nation-states.<sup>72</sup> To them, a Nordic identity is not a threat against the national identities, but rather something that can reinforce the national identities in the North. According to Uffe Østergård, Norden is perceived as “non-European, non-Catholic, anti-Rome, anti-imperialist, non-colonial, non-exploitative, peaceful, small, and social democratic”<sup>73</sup>. He points out that there are no “objective laws binding the

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<sup>70</sup> Joenniemi 1994a, 23-24.

<sup>71</sup> Joenniemi 1994a, 24.

<sup>72</sup> Stråth, Bo – Sørensen, Øystein (ed.) (1997): *The Cultural Construction of Norden*. Scandinavian University Press (Universitetsforlaget AS), Oslo, 19.

<sup>73</sup> Østergård, Uffe (1997): *The Geopolitics of Nordic Identity – From Composite States to Nation-states*. In Stråth, Bo and Sørensen, Øystein (ed.). *The Cultural Construction of Norden*. Scandinavian University Press (Universitetsforlaget AS), Oslo, 25.

people of the North together in a common destiny”<sup>74</sup> but instead, he sees Nordic identity as a mental construct, built on historical and cultural components. Concerning the Nordic identity versus the national ones, Østergård is on the same line as Stråth and Sørensen. To him, a trans-state Nordic identity coexists with the national identities<sup>75</sup>. The relationship between the Nordic identity and the individual national identities in Norden thus seems to be a peaceful one. These different identities rather strengthen than threaten each other. The Nordic identity is perceived as an additional level besides the national ones, not an alternative to them.

#### 4.1 Nordic identity in a crisis?

As already mentioned in the definition of the concept of identity, identities are constructed through differences. Following this logic, the Nordic identity is built on what differentiates it from others. If this other is Europe or the European Union, then a possible conclusion could be that rapprochement towards the EU reduces the differences and therefore threatens the Nordic identity. This was a popular suggestion made by scholars in the first half of the 1990s. Håkan Wiberg and Ole Wæver argue that “the very existence of the Cold War was among the preconditions for upholding this self-image because it was defined (partly) *by contrast*”.<sup>76</sup> When the contrast between Norden and the rest of Europe was not as clear as before, this, according to them, shook Norden’s perception of itself. Pertti Joenniemi believed that there was no longer room for a Nordic alternative between an increased emphasis on the national objectives on the one hand, and the euro enthusiasm on the other.<sup>77</sup> More recent studies, like Hans E. Andersson’s article *What activates an identity? The case of Norden* agrees with Wiberg and Wæver that the Nordic identity was put under severe stress in the beginning of the 1990s, but in the same time Andersson questions whether this actually was a consequence of the end of the Cold War and the increased significance of the EU. In his article, he suggests that it was rather the different economic interests in the Nordic countries that led to a weakened commitment to Nordic identity.<sup>78</sup> In his 2009 article,

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<sup>74</sup> Østergård, 70.

<sup>75</sup> Østergård, 71.

<sup>76</sup> Wiberg, Håkan and Wæver, Ole (1992): Norden in the Cold War Reality. In Øberg, Jan (ed.). *Nordic Security in the 1990s. Options in the Changing Europe*. Pinter Publishers, London, 28.

<sup>77</sup> Joenniemi, Pertti (1994b): Kampen om Norden; EU-bihang eller neo-region? In Bingen, Jon – Lindahl, Rutger (ed.) *Nordiske skjebnevalg? Europa-programmet*, Oslo, 77.

<sup>78</sup> Andersson, E. Hans (2010): What activates an Identity? The Case of Norden. In *International Relations*, 24 (46), 61.

*Reconstructing Nordic Significance in Europe on the Threshold of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Kazimierz Musiał also joins the above-mentioned scholars. To him, the new situation in the early 1990s threatened Norden's significance both internationally and among the home public. He feared that Norden would become irrelevant on the international scene and he questioned "whether the Nordic framework constituted an attractive and unifying construction for the citizens in the Nordic countries to identify with".<sup>79</sup>

In my mind, the perception that Norden all of a sudden lost significance in the early 1990s is exaggerated, as well as the notion that Nordic identity was in a crisis. Certainly, the great changes in Europe also had implications on Norden and the Nordic reality, but as my research shows, Norden never lost value; it was only overlooked when the EU entered the debate in Norden. The key problem with assertions such as the ones provided by the above-mentioned scholars is that they seem to put Norden and Nordic identity against Europe and a possible European identity. Their logic seems to be that if the EU becomes more popular in Norden, then Norden's popularity automatically has to decline. In my newspaper sources, the EU was never presented as an alternative to Norden. None of the writers behind the editorial articles suggested that the Nordic cooperation and the Nordic identity would have to leave room for the European equivalent. On the contrary, most of them believed that it was possible to combine being both Nordic and European, and they actually saw the EU as a way of renewing the Nordic cooperation. Even though Pertti Joenniemi has indicated that there was a crisis in the Nordic identity in the early 1990s, he also argued that Europe was not a threat against the Nordic identity.


"Europeanization does not demand a redefinition and an abandoning of our own identity, the Nordic "we", but instead a strategy for Europe can be founded on the sense of solidarity and a common value-system that already exists. (...) A meeting between Norden and Europe – a hypothetical one – does not lead to a fight where one of them is fighting against the other about a scarce and public political space. The meeting resembles more a gathering – and maybe even a reunion – if the memory of the history of ideas works the way it should".<sup>80</sup>  
(My translation)

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<sup>79</sup> Musiał, Kazimierz (2009): *Reconstructing Nordic Significance in Europe on the Threshold of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. *Scandinavian Journal of History*, Vol. 34, No.3, 288.

<sup>80</sup> Joenniemi 1994a, 43.

Joenniemi thus lifts up the similarities between Norden and Europe instead of the differences, and he indicates that it is possible to feel both Nordic and European at the same time. This is also cleverly illustrated in one of the cartoons in my newspaper sources. The cartoon in *Figure 5* below was published in Helsingin Sanomat on the day of the Finnish referendum. The cartoon contains eight boxes. The boxes show pictures of Space (Avaruus), the Galaxy (Linnunrata), the Solar System (Aurinkokunta), Earth (Maapallo), Europe (Eurooppa), Norden (Pohjola) and Finland (Suomi). In the last box, a Finnish voter is standing and looking at all these places that he belongs to. In a speech bubble he says: Why not? (Miksi ei?). The cartoon is a very good example of how the national, regional and international levels are not put against each other, but rather build a chain of identity, in this case all the way up to Space. The voter on the picture is a part of all these communities. He might feel closer to some of them than others, but they cannot replace each other.



**Figure 5.** Cartoon published in Helsingin Sanomat on October 16, 1994, page A2.

## 4.2 The commitment to Norden varies

The understanding that we have multiple identities has also been highlighted by Hans E. Andersson. According to him, also a state can have many identities and what activates one of them and not the other is dependent on situational relevance and commitment. Andersson writes, "While the former refers to the situation 'fitting' the specific characteristics of an identity, the latter implies that not all identities are equally

important.”<sup>81</sup> In the case of Norden, Andersson suggests that the Nordic identity is more visible in certain areas of cooperation and less in others. For example, when the Nordic Passport Union was challenged by the Schengen agreement, the Nordic identity was intensively activated because the Nordic countries were very committed to free movement in Norden. On the other hand, the Nordic identity in international environmental negotiations was less active in the 1990s than it had been in the 1970s. We often talk about Nordic identity in singular, when in fact the degree of commitment to Norden by the Nordic countries differs from subject to subject. My study found that the element of Nordicness was stronger in areas like values and when Norden was used as a point of reference, while for example Nordic religion was not a frequent theme. Apart from subjects, the degree of commitment to Norden also varies between the different countries and different times. My research indicates, among other things, that the Finnish editorial articles attached great importance to the renewal and strengthening of Nordic cooperation, the Swedish editorials talked a lot about Norden as a natural point of reference and the responsibility Norden had to the rest of the world and the Norwegian editorials stressed the Nordic unity and a fear of being isolated from its neighbours. The newspaper editorials rarely referred to Nordic identity explicitly, but through the thematic use of Norden in the editorials as well as the attitudes demonstrated towards Norden, one could conclude that Norden was viewed as something positive and uniting.

In the book *European Integration and National Identities. The Challenge of the Nordic States*, edited by Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver, several researchers reflect on the European integration in Norden from a national perspective. The focus in the book is on the national identities in Norden, but there are also mentions of Norden as an entity and of a Nordic identity. In the book, which was published in 2002, the alleged crisis of the Nordic identity in the early 1990s is no longer highlighted, but instead Nordic superiority and Norden’s difference from Europe once again enters the debate. Or as Lene Hansen writes in the conclusion, “‘Norden’ is juxtaposed to ‘the EU’, with the former being a natural, organic community amongst equally democratic, environmentalist, pro-women’s rights, etc. nations – the EU by contrast is the opposite of all these (good) things. ‘Norden’ is in short used as a significant marker to identify

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<sup>81</sup> Andersson, 48.

‘us’ against ‘Europe’“.<sup>82</sup> This is the same rhetoric which was used to describe Norden before the EU entered the Nordic picture in the early 1990s, and which according to my newspaper sources never stopped being used, at least not during the campaigns prior to the three EU-referenda in the autumn of 1994. The late 1980s and early 1990s constituted an important transition period in both Europe and Norden. The unpredictability that the changes brought with them naturally gave rise to reflections on the future of Norden. As demonstrated, a common view was that the end of the Cold War and the decline in the Nordic welfare system would result in a crisis in the Nordic identity. These assertions had more a character of theoretical assumptions than empirically grounded studies. As my research suggests, and as we can conclude with the knowledge we have today, almost 20 years later, the Nordic identity was not run over by the EU. Certainly, Norden had to adapt to the new challenges that the EU posed and it was surely neglected sometimes, but Norden still enjoyed the public esteem. In the EU-referenda campaigns in Finland, Sweden and Norway, Norden was used as an argument by both the Yes-side and the No-side. The EU-opponents wanted to maintain or strengthen the old Norden outside of the union, while the EU-supporters wanted to renew and strengthen Norden inside the EU.

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<sup>82</sup> Hansen, Lene (2002): Conclusion. In Hansen, Lene – Wæver, Ole (ed.) *European Integration and National Identity. The Challenge of the Nordic States*. Routledge, London, New York, 224.



## 5 Conclusions

The time around the 1994 EU-referenda was an exciting transition period. The old Europe, which had been divided into two, but nevertheless stood for something stable and predictable, was changing into something unknown. So also happened with Norden. The uncertainty forced Norden to choose paths. Was a future Norden going to be a part of Europe or against Europe? Was it possible to combine being both Nordic and European? These questions gave rise to several books and reports on the future of Norden in the early 1990s. Many of them believed that Norden was part of the past and that the Nordic countries would have to join the EU as not to be forgotten in the peripheral North. My research shows the contrary, that Norden never lost value but only became a little less fashionable. Both internally in Norden and outside of the region, the Nordic values were still admired. Transparency, the welfare system and gender equality were still viewed as typical Nordic values. The EU-supporters believed that these values could be best defended inside the EU since the maintaining of, for example, the welfare system needed stable economies. The EU-opponents on the other hand believed that the preservation of Nordic values required the Nordic countries to stay outside of the bloc creation that they believed the EU constituted. In the debates prior to the three Nordic EU-referenda it also became clear that the Nordic countries did not intend to play a passive role inside the European Union, but rather they were planning for a “Nordification” of Europe from the inside of the union. Whether this has actually happened since Finland and Sweden joined the EU is questionable, but at least the intent was to bring Nordic values to the EU. The results of this study also indicate that the Nordic countries still turned to each other for advice and comparison; Norden was still the natural point of reference, not Europe. Moreover, even though the institutionalised Nordic cooperation had seen better days, nobody wanted to end the cooperation but rather renew it and strengthen it. It was natural that the EU received a lot of attention in the Nordic media prior to the referenda, since the voters needed to be informed about what the options in the referenda were. In my opinion though, the Nordic presence in the media the last month before the three referenda was surprisingly high. It was evident that Norden and Europe were closely intertwined. Or as Lene Hansen puts it: “Even those who argue for ‘Norden’ as an alternative to the EU present this option *in opposition to* Europe, not in isolation from the European question.”<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> Hansen, 13.

It was, however, clear that Norden would have to change to cope with the new situation. Even if Norden remained a strong brand, it unavoidably ended up in the shadow of the EU. Lene Hansen says that it was Europe that conditioned Norden and not the other way around.<sup>84</sup> The Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat distinguished itself by publishing a lot of editorials on the future Nordic cooperation. It viewed the current Nordic cooperation nostalgic and it heavily opposed the idea of creating a stronger Nordic union as an alternative to the EU. Instead, the editorials hoped that the EU-accessions would offer a renaissance and an additional arena for the Nordic cooperation. Finland actually continued on the same line as Helsingin Sanomat after the accession in the EU. In 1997, Finland took the initiative to establish the Northern Dimension, a policy framework for the Northern countries of the European Union and the neighbouring non-union countries. The Northern Dimension is today a framework shared by the EU, Norway, Iceland and Russia. Other partners are different regional councils and financial institutions.

Dagens Nyheter distinguished itself by discussing the responsibility Sweden and Norden had to the rest of Europe. Many articles regretted that Norden had not been able to create a stronger political organisation, but the solution was to make the best out of the EU by introducing Swedish values in the union. Dagens Nyheter often referred to the Swedish values, while Helsingin Sanomat and Aftenposten referred to the same values as Nordic ones. The Swedish editorials viewed Sweden as the core of Norden and they were both impressed and worried of Sweden's own position when little brother Finland voted Yes to EU and showed the way for the rest of Norden. The editorial articles in Helsingin Sanomat also expressed pride over the Nordic values, but in the same time they were more submissive than the articles in Dagens Nyheter. HS stressed more what the EU could do for Finland than what Finland could do for the EU. My suggestion to why this was so, is that the Finns were so eager to finally join the Western Europe and the EU that they were more willing to adapt to EU standards and working methods. Also, the Finnish self-esteem was lower than the Swedish and Norwegian ones, or perhaps more coloured by realist politics.

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<sup>84</sup> Hansen, 13

The editorial articles in *Aftenposten* were of a more defensive character. The No-supporters were in majority in Norway, and the newspaper took the role of defending the EU and shooting down the No-side's arguments. In Norway, the economic situation was better than in Finland and Sweden thanks to the country's oil revenues. The future financing of the welfare system was therefore not discussed as much as in the two other countries. Instead, *Aftenposten* stressed the Nordic unity and how isolated Norway would be if the country did not follow its Nordic neighbours. Especially after Finland and Sweden had voted Yes to EU, the newspaper lifted up the fear of being left alone.

All three newspapers in my research were positive towards the European Union. This has of course influenced my study heavily and the study is mainly to be seen as an example of how Norden was presented by the Yes-side. *Helsingin Sanomat* and *Dagens Nyheter* did to a larger extent than *Aftenposten* also give voice to EU-opponents, but this cannot in any way be compared with the attention the EU-supporters received. As the major, or one of the major, newspapers in their respective countries, however, *Helsingin Sanomat*, *Dagens Nyheter* and *Aftenposten* had a significant role as creators of public opinion. Whether the opinions expressed in the editorial pages of these newspapers actually played a role in the outcome of the three EU-referenda, is not possible to say from the results of this study. The results do, however, offer empirically grounded descriptions and analyses of how these newspapers viewed Norden in the EU-referenda context. Contrary to the scholars, who in the beginning of the 1990s, suggested that Norden had lost significance and that the Nordic identity was in a crisis, this study shows that this belief was not shared by the journalists, guest columnists, politicians, authors and activists who got their voices heard in the newspapers of my study. The Nordic identity was not explicitly visible in the newspaper sources, but rather it permeated the whole debate on Norden. There exists a sense of togetherness between the Nordic countries, which is not seen between just any countries. The identity has historical and cultural elements and is manifested through a concern for the other Nordic countries, a strong interdependence, and certain Nordic values, which are believed better than others. This study suggests that the Nordic identity was not in a crisis but only a bit overshadowed by the EU.

Since the aim of this study has been to qualitatively describe and analyse how Norden was presented in the chosen newspapers, the quantitative tables in Chapter 2 do not

really do my material justice. Many articles consisted of several themes and several frames and it was difficult to code each article according to only one theme and one frame. Nevertheless, the tables are, in my opinion, valuable since they give a general and an easily apprehensible overview of the most dominant themes and frames in the different newspapers. The decision to only include the editorial pages in this study is motivated in two ways. Firstly, the aim of the study was to analyse Norden as an argument in the three newspapers and the editorial page is the place where opinions and recommendations are most evidently manifested. Secondly, out of practical reasons I viewed it more important to analyse editorial pages from a longer time-span than to include all parts of the newspapers but instead limit the period of time.

In hindsight, we can see that the European integration did not hinder a continuing Nordic cooperation. The cooperation has continued through the official Nordic institutions, but also through grassroots associations and a close connection between Nordic politicians. At the time of the writing of this thesis, a new born interest for Norden is seen in the Nordic countries. This interest was especially manifested after the publication of the book *Förbundsstaten Norden* (United Nordic Federation) by Swedish historian Gunnar Wetterberg, in the autumn of 2010.<sup>85</sup> In an opinion poll among people in the Nordic countries, done in connection to the book release, 42% of the respondents were positive or very positive towards a Nordic federation.<sup>86</sup> Another recent important Nordic publication is the so-called Stoltenberg report, named after the former Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Thorvald Stoltenberg. In the report, Stoltenberg gives 13 suggestions on how the Nordic cooperation on foreign- and security policy issues could be strengthened.<sup>87</sup> The popularity of Norden thus seems to fluctuate in time and it is interesting to compare today's situation with the one at the time of the Nordic EU-referenda. In the early 1990s, when Europe and the EU rose in popularity in Norden this did not mean that Norden's popularity fell drastically. Similarly, today's increased interest in Norden does not necessarily mean a decrease in Europe's popularity. This was, for example, shown in a recent study measuring the Finns' attitudes towards the European Union. The study, which was conducted by the

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<sup>85</sup> Wetterberg, Gunnar (2010): *Förbundsstaten NORDEN*. TemaNord 2010:582. Nordiska ministerrådet, Köpenhamn.

<sup>86</sup> Nordic Council and Nordic Council of Ministers (2012b): *Surprisingly strong support for United Nordic Federation*, website.

<sup>87</sup> Stoltenberg, Thorvald (2009): *Nordisk Samarbeid om Utenriks- og Sikkerhetspolitikk*, website.

Finnish policy and pro-market think tank EVA, Elinkeinoelämän valtuuskunta,<sup>88</sup> shows that 55% of the asked Finns were favourably disposed towards the Finnish EU-membership. This is the highest number of support of the Finnish EU-membership since the country joined the European Union. My study therefore suggests that Norden and Europe are not mutually exclusive; there is room enough for both Nordic and European cooperation. It is possible to feel both Nordic and European in the same time.

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<sup>88</sup> Haavisto, Ilkka (2012): EU VAI EI? EVAn arvo- ja asennetutkimus 2012. Taloustieto Oy, Helsinki. Webiste.

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Cygnel-Nuortie, Katarina (1996): *Yritysjohtaja julkisuudessa. Suomalaisten, ruotsalaisten ja norjalaisten yritysjohtajien osallistuminen joukkoviestimissä syksyllä 1994 käytyyn EU-keskusteluun*. Helsingin yliopisto, Helsinki.

## Appendix 1 – Code schedule

<b>Source:</b>	1 HS 2 DN 3 AP
<b>Date:</b>	-----
<b>Title of editorial:</b>	-----
<b>Type of editorial:</b>	1 Long editorial article 2 Short editorial article 3 Column/Commentary 4 Guest column 5 Photograph 6 Cartoon 7 Press cutting from another newspaper
<b>Author:</b>	1 Newspaper's own staff, who if mentioned: 2 Guest author, who: 3 Signature, who: 4 Other newspaper, which one: 5 Photographer, who: 6 Cartoonist, who:
<b>Description:</b>	----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
<b>In Vivo:</b>	----- -----
<b>Analysis:</b>	----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
<b>Theme:</b>	-----
<b>Frame:</b>	-----

## Appendix 2 – The Citations in Original Languages

“[j]ossa maalaillaan kaikilla sateenkaaren väreillä harhaa uudesta uljaasta pohjoismaisesta yhteistyöstä”.

(“Ruotsin vaalitulos”, press cutting from Kouvolan Sanomat, published in Helsingin Sanomat on September 21, 1994, page A2.)

“Pohjoismailla on paljon enemmän yhteistä keskenään kuin EU-maiden kanssa. Pohjoismaisen yhteistyön suuret konkreettiset saavutukset ovat kuitenkin olleet vähäisiä sitten passivapauden ja vapaiden työmarkkinoiden luomisen. (...) Euroopan yhteisö ajoi pohjoismaiden ohitse. Pohjoismaiden kiinnostus siirtyi yhteistyön kehittämiseen laajemmilla eurooppalaisilla foorumeilla. Paluu takaisin pohjoismaiseen yhteistyöhön olisi taka-askele, joka tuskin innostaisi ketään”.

(“Mikä ihmeen ‘Pohjoismaiden yhteisö’?”, column, published in Helsingin Sanomat September 27, 1994, page A2.)

“Visst kan man beklaga att de nordiska länderna inte lyckades skapa en starkare gemensam politisk organisation. Men det tåget har redan gått. Danmark är medlem av EU sedan många år och Finland har redan röstat ja. Om vi i framtiden skall kunna driva en gemensam nordisk politik måste det ske inom den vidare politiska ram som EU utgör”.

(“Europa existerar även på måndag”, guest column, published in Dagens Nyheter November 11, 1994, page A2.)

“Nå er det opp til det norske folk å bestemme om også vi skal delta i utdypningen av det nordiske samarbeide innenfor den bredere europeiske ramme. Og det er opp til oss å avgjøre om et samlet Norden skal gjøre seg gjeldende ved utformningen av fremtidens Europa”.

(“Overbevisende ja-flertall”, long editorial article, published in Aftenposten November 14, 1994, page 14.)

“I femti år har først krigen, og så øst-vest-spenningen, splittet Norden. Nå legger ikke lenger geopolitikken, men muligens vi selv, hindringer i veien for nordisk samarbeide om utenrikspolitikk og forsvar”.

(“Splittet Norden på EU-tog i fart?”, commentary, published in Aftenposten November, 17, 1994, page 16.)

“En av poängerna med parallella medlemskapsförhandlingar var ju att forma ett starkt nordiskt block med stora möjligheter att påverka EU:s utveckling. (...) Drömmen om ett intensifierat nordiskt samarbete inom unionens ram stannar vid en dröm med Norge utanför”.

(“Landet Annorlunda utanför”, long editorial article, published in Dagens Nyheter November 30, 1994, page A2.)

“Kun meillä pelotellaan itsenäisyyden ja omaleimaisuuden menettämisellä, muukalaistulvalla ja sosiaaliturvan romahduksella, kannattaa katsoa Tanskaan. EU ei ole murentanut tanskalaista hyvinvointimallia eikä tuonut maahan laumoittain vapaamatkustajia nauttimaan korkeasta sosiaaliturvasta tai kahmimaan itselleen maat ja mannut”.

(“Tanskan uusi taudinmääritys”, press cutting from Aamulehti, published in Helsingin Sanomat September 24, 1994, page A2.)

“[m]åste även nejsidan konstatera att Danmark, trots ett mångårigt medlemskap, fortfarande är en demokrati där folketinget har betydelse, och ett land där man kan avnjuta smörrebröd, röda korvar och öl”.

(“Debatt om EU gynnar jasidan”, short editorial article, published in Dagens Nyheter October 21, 1994, page A2.)

“Kun Ruotsi jätti EU-hakemuksensa, se ei kertonut siitä etukäteen Suomelle tai Norjalle. Se halusi varmistaa itselleen parhaan paikan jonossa. Yhtä lailla virallinen Suomi on valmis kulkemaan omaa tietään, vaikka Ruotsi ja Norja joutuisivat jäämään ulkopuolelle”.

(“Mikä ihmeen “Pohjolan yhteisö”? “, column, published in Helsingin Sanomat, September 27, 1994, page A2.)

“För svenskt näringsliv blir det ännu mer påtagligt att utanförskap är konstigt. Finländsk skogsindustri, hårdaste konkurrent till den svenska skogsindustrin, skulle slippa tidsfördröjande gränskontroller vid transporter till kontinenten, medan den svenska skulle ha problemet kvar. Den skulle till skillnad från den svenska få inflytande över EU:s regelverk för skogsindustrin.”

(“Nytt läge inför svenska folkomröstningen”, short editorial, published in Dagens Nyheter October 18, 1994, page A2.)

“Virkeligheten er også langt borte når Bondevik mener at det er viktig å få frem at «svenskesuget er psykologi og ikke basert på realiteter». Finnes det for Norge i dag en mer bastant politisk realitet enn Sveriges medlemskap i EU?”

(“Bondevik”, short editorial, published in Aftenposten November 15, 1994, page 18.)

”Suomen asema unionissa tai ulkopuolella riippuu tietenkin aivan ratkaisevaksi Ruotsin asemasta”.

(“EU-keskustelusta sekamelskaa”, press cutting from Ilkka, published in Helsingin Sanomat on September 23, 1994, page A2.)

“Om jag vore finländare skulle jag också vilja att Sverige gick med i EU. Det skulle kännas tryggare med Sverige som backup och som en bro ner till Europa”.

(“Från kol och stål till mjöl och fläsk”, guest column, published in Dagens Nyheter on November 6, 1994, page A2.)

“Ett centralt element i svensk neutralitetspolitik – att vi bör sitta still i båten för att inte skapa oro kring Finland – bortfaller när Finland självt söker även sin säkerhetspolitiska förankring västerut.”

(“Nytt läge inför den svenska folkomröstningen”, short editorial article, published in Dagens Nyheter October 18, 1994, page A2.)

“Og den eventuelle nordiske splittelse faller i så fall sammen i tid med at de nordiske land har trukket opp rammen for en samarbeidsavtale om produksjon, anskaffelse og utnyttelse av forsvarsmateriell. Avtalen er en historisk begivenhet, som tilsier at det utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitiske skille i Norden bør forbli ensaga blott”.

(“Norge klassens sinke?”, short editorial article, published in Aftenposten on November 24, 1994, page 18.)

“At det skulle bli henne som trakk konklusjonen, er illustrerende både for den finske og den nordiske nyorientering i forholdet til det europeiske fellesskap.”

(“Norge klassens sinke?”, short editorial article, published in Aftenposten on November 24, 1994, page 18.)

“Hänen [Esko Aho] asenteensa on, että “EU-kysymys hoituu, jos on hoituakseen”, kuten hän sanoi lauantaina Kalevan haastattelussa. Aho ei halua lähteä avoimeen kampanjointiin, kuten esimerkiksi presidentti on tehnyt. (...) Ruotsin ja Norjan pääministerit kamppailevat täysin voimin sen puolesta, mihin he henkilökohtaisesti uskovat ja minkä he katsovat olevan maansa etu.”

(“Carlsson ja Gro uskaltavat panna itsensä likoon”, column, published in Helsingin Sanomat, September 21, 1994, page A2.)

“Tässä tilanteessa EU:n tilalle ehdotettu pohjoismainen yhteistyö tarkoittaisi sitä, että Suomi köyttäisi itsensä kiinni hukkuvaan laivaan”.

(“Ruotsin serkusta Viron veljeksi”, guest column, published in Helsingin Sanomat on September 20, 1994, page A2.)

“Monet ammattiliitot sekä nais- ja kansalaisliikkeet EU-maissa asettavat paljon toiveita Pohjolan mukaantuloon ja sen antamaan esimerkkiin”.

(“EU ei määrää sosiaaliturvaamme”, guest column published in Helsingin Sanomat on October 2, 1994, page A2.)

“Pohjoismaisen mallin puolustus on tärkeää, koska Pohjoismaat ovat onnistuneet luomaan tähänastisen maailmanhistorian parhaan yhteiskuntarakenteen. Suomen ja Ruotsin on löydettävä uutta potkua talouteensa säilyttääkseen hyvinvointivaltion perustan. Norjalla ei valtavien öljyrahojen ansiosta ole samaa huolta. (...) Talouden ja hyvinvointimallin puolustuksen kohdalla avainsana on kansallinen edunvalvonta. Turvataksemme etumme meidän täytyy päästä siihen pöytään, jossa päätöksiä tehdään.”

(“Suomen valinta”, column, published in Helsingin Sanomat on October 13, 1994, page A2.)

“Tarvitsemme Suomen tarkasti vaalimaa pohjoismaista perinnettä arvostellun unionin demokratiavajeen poistamiseksi ja päätösprosessin avoimuuden edistämiseksi”.

(“EU-Suomesta Itämeri-alueen keskus”, guest column, published in Helsingin Sanomat on October 8, 1994, page A2.)

“Det är inte svenskarna som har skapat EU, och kanske hade vi velat att den politiska organisationen i Europa hade utformats på något annat sätt. Men vi kan inte skapa ett alternativt EU enligt svensk eller nordisk modell. EU finns där redan. (...) Våra möjligheter att utöva något politiskt inflytande på en europeisk nivå förutsätter att vi ansluter oss till den politiska organisation som finns och försöker påverka den inifrån”.

(“Europa existerar även på måndag”, guest column published in Dagens Nyheter on November 11, 1994, page A2.)

“Om länderna längst upp i norr abdikerar från ett sådant delansvar betyder det i praktiken att vi istället ger ett motsvarande stort inflytande till andra länder. (...) Något brutalt kan man säga att Eftaländernas inträde i EU kan väntas minska de sydeuropeiska, latinska och protektionistiska ländernas inflytande över Europas framtid, och därmed bidra till att utveckla Europa i en riktning som mer ligger i linje med intressen och värderingar i norra Europa.”

(“Vårt ansvar för Europa”, press cutting from Ekonomisk debatt published in Dagens Nyheter on October 16, 1994, page A2.)

“Ordföranden låter sympatisk när påfallande “svenskt” talar för öppenhet, jämställdhet, miljövänlighet samt institutioner närmare folket”.

(“En vänlig knuff från Santer”, long editorial article published in Dagens Nyheter on October 31, 1994, page A2.)

“Blir Norge, Sverige og Finland medlem så vil Kola bli EUs nærområde. Eget opprydningsprogram og eget Kola-fond. Sverige og Finland er imidlertid langt mer interessert i at EU engasjerer seg i Østersjøen, i de baltiske land og i St. Petersburg-området. EUs engasjement på Kola vil derfor i stor grad avhenge av Norges fremtidige tilknytning til unionen.”



(“Blir atom-trusselen EUs ansvar?”, commentary published in Aftenposten on October 18, 1994, page 14.)

“Demokratian asiaparina on Pohjolassa pidetty julkisen päätöksenteon avoimuutta. Euroopan unioni ei ole demokraattinen järjestö, eikä se kunnioita julkisuusperiaatetta. (...) Miksi sitten Pohjoismaat eivät menisi mukaan muuttamaan unionia? Mielestäni tilanne pitää nähdä realistisesti; vaikutusvaltamme olisi kovin vähäinen, ja toisaalta, jos unionilla olisi tarve muuttua meidän mallimme mukaiseksi, olisi niin tapahtunut jo Maastrichtin prosessin yhteydessä”.

(“Parempi Eurooppa ihmisten ehdoilla”, guest column published in Helsingin Sanomat on October 1, 1994, page A2.)

“EU:n ulkopuolella Suomi säilyttää itselleen mahdollisuuden pitää kiinni pyrkimyksistä kunnioittaa yhtäläisesti kaikkia ihmisiä ja vaalia maailmanlaajaa solidaarisuutta”.

(“EU edustaa länttä varsin heikosti”, guest column published in Helsingin Sanomat on September 25, 1994, page A2.)

“Spørsmålet som reiser seg, er derfor om vi i Norge ser den muligheten og utfordringen som ligger i å stå utenfor den sterke blokkdannelsen nettopp for å kunne fortsette den viktige rollen som brobygger –både østover og sørover”.

(“Norge og EU-blokken”, guest column published in Aftenposten on November 18, 1994, page 14.)

“Välimeren maissa mentaliteetti on aivan toinen. Osaa direktiiveistä ei väitteiden mukaan ole ehditty tai välitetty kääntää esimerkiksi kreikaksi. Niitä ei siis tunneta, puhumattakaan, että niitä noudatettaisiin. (...) ei tarkoita, että virkakoneistomme pitäisi tinkiä korkeasta pohjoismaisesta työmoraalista ja lainkuuliaisuudesta. Liityttäessä sellaiseen suureen kansainväliseen yhteisöön kuin EU on kuitenkin opeteltava toimimaan samoilla pelisäännöillä kuin muut. Se koskee myös direktiivien asemaa ja noudattamista.”

(“Suomi on direktiivien luvattu maa”, column published in Helsingin Sanomat on October 12, 1994, page A2.)